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A Security Verification Framework for SysML Activity Diagrams
Samir Ouchani
Concordia University, 2013
UML and SysML play a central role in modern software and systems engineering.
They are considered as the de facto standard for modeling software and systems. Today’s
systems are created from a myriad of interacting parts that are combined to produce visible
behavior. The main difficulty arises from the different ways in modeling each component
and the way they interact with each other. Moreover, nowadays secure software has become
an essential part in industrial development. One challenge in academia as well as in industry
is to produce a secure product. Another challenge is to prove its correctness especially when
the software environment is imprecise and uncertain.
The aim of this thesis is to provide a practical and formal framework that enables
security risk assessment and security requirements verification on a system modeled as a
composition of UML/SysML behavioral diagrams. Our main contribution is a novel ap-
proach to automatically verify security of systems on their design models based on secu-
rity requirements, probabilistic adversarial interactions between potential attackers and the
system’s models. These structures are shaped to provide an elegant way to define the com-
bination between different kinds of diagrams. We rely on stochastic security templates to
specify security properties and a standard catalogue of attack patterns to build a library
of attacks design patterns. The result of the interaction between selected attack scenarios
and the composed diagrams with the instantiated security properties are used to quantify
security risk by applying probabilistic model-checker. To handle the verification process
iii
scalability, our approach allows the verification of large system efficiently by optimizing
and avoiding the global model construction. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our ap-
proach, we apply our methodology on academia as well as industrial benchmarks.
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Unified and Systems Modeling Languages (UML and SysML) [60, 61] are software and
systems engineering dedicated modeling languages developed by the Object Management
Group (OMG) and the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE). UML and
SysML are prominent object-oriented modeling languages that have become today’s de-
facto standards for modern software and systems engineering. They support both structural
and behavioral modeling, and they bear the composition and the interaction between dif-
ferent types of behavioral diagrams. SysML reuses a subset of UML packages and extends
others with specific systems engineering features such as probability. It covers four main
perspectives of systems modeling: structure, behavior, requirements, and parametric dia-
grams [60]. Particularly, SysML activity diagrams are behavioral diagrams used to model
system behaviors at various levels of abstraction [35]. In addition, they support systems’
composition by the call behavior and send/receive artifacts.
1
1.1 Motivation
A major challenge in software and systems development process is to advance error de-
tection at early stages of their life-cycles. It has been shown that the cost of repairing a
software flaw during maintenance is approximately 500 times higher than fixing it at early
design phases [5]. Figure 1.1 depicts bugs introduction, detection, and repair costs during
software life cycle. It shows that only 15% of flaws are detected in the initial design phase,
whereas the cost of fixing them at this phase is extremely beneficial as compared to fixing
them at the testing phase. Therefore, an ambitious challenge is to accelerate the verification
process of a product based on its design artifacts.
Analysis Conceptual























(in 1,000 US $)
Figure 1.1: Software Development Error Cost [5].
Yet, another more ambitious challenge is to accurately specify, express and measure
the security level of a product based on its design artifacts. Various techniques have been
proposed for the verification of software and hardware such as model checking [15], type
checking, equivalence checking [38], theorem proving [55], as well as static and dynamic
analysis. Particularly in software and systems engineering [21], the most popular technique
used to verify UML/SysML behavioral diagrams is model checking.
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Model checking [9, 15] is an automatic formal verification technique that checks sys-
tems specifications on finite-state concurrent systems. Generally, temporal logic is used to
express system requirements and symbolic-based algorithms are implemented to check if
those requirements hold on the system model or not. If the property is violated, a coun-
terexample is provided. In addition to qualitative model checking, quantitative verification
techniques based on probabilistic model checkers [5, 27] have recently gained popularity.
Probabilistic verification offers the capability of measuring the satisfiability probability of
a given property on systems that inherently exhibit probabilistic behavior. In this thesis, we
use the PRISM probabilistic symbolic model checker [50] for our experiments.
Despite its wide use, model checking is generally a resource-intensive process that
requires a large amount of memory and processing time. This is due to the fact that the sys-
tems’ state space may grow exponentially with the number of variables combined with the
presence of concurrent behaviors, which may hinder the verification process. Consequently,
it is of a major importance to reduce the verification process complexity. To overcome this
issue, various techniques have been explored [5, 9, 15, 90] for qualitative model checking
and then leveraged to the probabilistic case. Among these techniques, several solutions
aim at optimizing the employed model checking algorithms by introducing symbolic data
structures based on binary decision diagrams [15], while others target the analysis of the
model itself. Henceforth, two classes of solutions are found in the literature: abstraction and
compositional verification. The former provides a minimized representation of the global
system under verification. Whereas, the latter avoids the construction of the considered
global system during the verification process. This thesis concentrates on both classes.
Abstraction is one of the most relevant techniques for addressing the state explosion
problem [5, 9, 15, 90]. It can be defined as a mapping from a concrete model into a more
3
abstract one that encapsulates the systems’ behavior while being of a reduced size. The in-
tuition behind this transformation is to be able to check a property against an abstract model
and then to infer safely the same results on the concrete model. Abstraction techniques can
be classified into four categories: 1) Abstraction by state merging, 2) Abstraction on vari-
ables, 3) Abstraction by restriction, and 4) Abstraction by observer automata. As well as,
the well-known compositional verification techniques [10]: partitioned transition relation,
lazy parallel composition, interface processes, and assume-guarantee. Our proposed frame-
work takes advantage of the three first categories of abstraction, and the interface processes
technique that complies with the composition of SysML activity diagrams.
Owing to the fact that it is never enough to just ensure the functional correctness
of a given system [36], ensuring the security of a system is a real challenge. Especially,
Symantec statistics [56] show an increasing by 42% of attacks for 5291 vulnerabilities in
2012 versus 4989 vulnerabilities in 2011. In addition, McAfee [53] announced in Septem-
ber 2012 that a mass fraud campaign planned against 30 US banks is supposed to occur by
spring 2013. From a security perspective, a strong system is one in which the cost of an
attack is greater than the potential gain to the attacker. Conversely, a weak system is one
where the cost of an attack is less than the potential gain. The cost of an attack should take
into account not only money, but also time to recovery and potential punishment for crim-
inal activities [59]. For this purpose different attack models have been deployed such as:
attack tree [52], attack graph [78], and network attack graph [78]. By using the existing at-
tack models, there is a gap between the system and the attack semantics. Hence, we propose
to use SysML activity diagrams to model attacks by relying on the attack standard CAPEC1
that is developed by the community knowledge resource for building secure software.
It is extremely important to provide a mechanism employing quantitative techniques
1http://capec.mitre.org, Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification sponsored by the Na-
tional Cyber Security Division of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
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for security evaluation of software and systems based on their design models. In this thesis,
we address the issue of security risk assessment of software/systems modeled by using
SysML activity diagrams. The goal is to gauge how well a product is meeting its security
requirements. Since we use model-checking technique, temporal logic is used to express
security properties. The downside of temporal logic resides in its expressiveness. It is
difficult to express a temporal logic formula starting from a natural language statement. To
circumvent this downside, we propose to automatically generate security properties from
SysML activity diagrams.
1.2 Problem Statement
Current research initiatives focus mainly on qualitative model checking of SysML to ensure
the correctness of systems security and functionality. Furthermore, most of the proposed
approaches are intended to verify or propose a formal model of only a single behavioral
diagram [3, 8, 13, 20, 22, 40, 41, 43, 44, 46, 81]. To verify these diagrams, the existing ap-
proaches [3, 6, 7, 13, 18, 20, 22, 40, 41, 75] ignore systems composition. More especially,
they do not show the preservation of the system requirements while they use generally
model-checking. In addition, most of these approaches inherit the model checker limita-
tions. Furthermore, security is rarely verified in UML and SysML behavioral diagrams.
Since SysML is a young modeling language that extends UML with system features, only
few related works exist. Herein, this thesis aims at investigating and answering fundamental
questions:
1. How SysML activity diagrams are composed?
2. How to specify security aspect in SysML activity diagrams?
3. How to verify and evaluate security in SysML activity diagrams?
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4. How to avoid the model checking limitations?
1.3 Objectives
The main goal of this thesis is to check and quantify the security of systems at design
level by introducing security properties and potential attack models. Thus, we propose
a set of stochastic security templates values and a library of attack models with varied
potential gains that can exploit the main system vulnerabilities. The security properties to
be verified are instantiated easily from the proposed templates. The objectives of this thesis
are summarized as follows:
1. Providing an efficient verification framework to evaluate security of systems modeled
by SysML activity diagrams,
2. Studying the formal verification background and surveying the existing related work
and model checking tools,
3. Facilitating the specification of the system security and functional requirements,
4. Giving an adequate formal semantics for SysML activity diagram,
5. Demonstrating the efficiency of the proposed framework on real systems.
1.4 Proposed Methodology
This section describes our framework to specify and verify the security of systems mod-
eled by using SysML activity diagrams. As an improvement over the existing solutions,
our proposed framework targets systems composed of different parts. Furthermore, it au-




























































Figure 1.2: Security Verification Framework.
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proposed security and attack templates. In addition, it overcomes the model checking lim-
itations by proposing two efficient approaches: abstraction and compositional verification.
The proposed framework depicted in Figure 1.2 is based on model checking, and it develops
five main concepts: security templates, a standard library of attack patterns, extracting the
semantics of the studied diagrams, coding the semantics in Prism input language, abstract-
ing the diagrams, and dividing the property and conquer its satisfiability. The bold font in
Figure 1.2 indicates the automatic procedures.
A given SysML activity diagrams can be obtained from a system specification docu-
ment, or extracted from a source code. First, we use SysML activity diagrams to develop a
library of CAPEC attack application-independent templates with varied potential gains that
can exploit the system vulnerabilities. By using this library, application-dependent attack
scenarios are instantiated and the interaction between the attack and the system diagrams is
defined. In order to subject this interaction to the model checker, the security requirements
are represented by SysML activity diagrams. Then, a specification algorithm is proposed
to generate their equivalent PCTL expressions. Before verification, we propose to reduce
the model size of the diagram under verification. First, we introduce a set of abstraction
rules that abstracts the diagram with respect to a system requirement. Then, we minimize
the abstracted diagram by providing a set of minimization rules. As we deal with a com-
posed diagram, we propose to verify the system locally by distributing a property over each
diagram component. For verification, we extract the formal semantics of SysML activity di-
agrams. This helps to encode easily diagrams into the input language of the PRISM model
checker. To ensure the correctness of our proposed framework, we prove the soundness of
each step in the framework.
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1.5 Thesis Contributions
In this section, we summarize the main contributions in this thesis.
1. Security verification framework. We propose a practical and formal framework to
specify and verify the security of systems modeled by SysML activity diagrams.
2. Studying the related work. We survey the most existing initiatives and tools dedi-
cated to the formal description of UML and SysML behavioral diagrams, the system
security specification, and the formal verification.
3. Formal semantics of SysML activity diagrams. We formalize SysML activity di-
agrams by giving an adequate meaning that can be supported by the existing model
checking tools. As we study behavioral diagrams, we developed a calculus based on
the structural operational semantics.
4. Formal semantics of PRISM language. We formalize PRISM model by providing
a syntax and operational semantics that support the main operators of PRISM.
5. Verification. Our verification mechanism uses the PRISM kernel to check systems
requirements. It encodes the semantics of SysML activity diagrams in the input lan-
guage of PRISM. We prove the soundness of the verification by showing that our
encoding preserves the satisfiability of the existing properties.
6. Attack Modeling. We propose to use SysML activity diagrams to model the attack
standard CAPEC.
7. Security Specification. We express security properties by considering SysML activ-
ity diagrams as a specification language. We present an algorithm to generate PCTL
expressions from SysML activity diagrams.
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8. Abstraction. We propose to abstract SysML activity diagrams by ignoring the ir-
relevant behaviors and minimizing their structure. We prove the soundness of the
proposed abstraction by showing the preservation of properties satisfiability before
and after abstraction.
9. Compositional Verification. We propose a compositional verification approach ded-
icated to SysML activity diagrams. It distributes a property over diagrams which
helps to verify the distributed properties locally. We prove the soundness of the prop-
erty decomposition by showing that the satisfiability of the global property can be
deduced from the results of the local properties.
10. Application. Our framework is implemented as a java plugin with the eclipse-based
TOPCASED toolkit, and it is successfully applied on real case studies.
1.6 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 explores the background needed for our thesis. First, we explore some
formal models dedicated to probabilistic system modeling. We present the appro-
priate temporal logics to specify system requirements. Then, the concepts of non-
probabilistic and probabilistic verification procedures are detailed. Also, we show
the main techniques needed in verification. Finally, a classification of the existing
probabilistic model checking tools is given.
• Chapter 3 is a collection of four papers: [63], [64], [70], [72], and one submitted
journal [65]. It presents the probabilistic verification framework of SysML activity
diagrams. It is implemented as a frontend with PRISM. We first describe diagrams
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as reported by OMG/INCOSE standard. Then, we formalize them by giving the ex-
pected semantics. And, we present the semantics of PRISM models that conform
to the studied diagrams. Then, our verification framework is detailed and its sound-
ness is proved. Finally, we describe the experimental results and we compare our
framework to existing related work.
• Chapter 4 is the result of the following papers: [67], [68], and [66]. The proposed
abstraction approach is detailed, and, its soundness is proved. The impact of the
abstraction framework is shown by presenting the experimental results and comparing
it to the related work.
• Chapter 5 details the compositional verification framework and proves its soundness.
First, it shows the efficiency of the composition presenting a promising experimen-
tal results. Finally, it discusses existing related work. Chapter 5 is submitted as a
conference paper [69].
• Chapter 6 proposes our security specification framework. First, it presents and models
the standard attack patterns. Then, it details the security specification algorithm that
generates a system requirements by defining the system/attack composition model.
Finally, it presents the experimental results and surveys the existing related work.
Chapter 6 contains two conference papers: [62] and [71].
• Chapter 7 concludes our work by summarizing the main contributions in the thesis,





Verifying a system using model checking is a three steps procedure: system modeling, sys-
tem specification, and verification. In system modeling, the system design is converted into
a formalism accepted by the used model checker tool. The specification step asserts how
the system can behave. Commonly, temporal logic is used to express systems’ specifica-
tions. The verification process explores exhaustively the state space of the system model to
check automatically if the specifications hold or not. When a specification is not satisfied,
a counterexample (sequence of states) is produced showing the system failures.
This chapter introduces the main concepts needed in this thesis. In Section 2.2, some
formal models dedicated to system design are described. Also, temporal logics for sys-
tem requirement specification are presented in Section 2.3. Then, the concepts of non-
probabilistic and probabilistic verification procedures are detailed in Section 2.4. Also, two
main verification techniques are described in Section 2.5. Finally, a classification of the ex-
isting probabilistic model checker tools is given in Section 2.6 and we conclude the present
chapter in Section 2.7.
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2.2 System Models
In the literature, some probabilistic formal models are used for the evaluation of perfor-
mance and dependability of information-processing systems. Most of them are automa-
ton, Markovian, or PetriNets based models. Mainly, we cite: Markov Decision Processes
(MDP), Probabilistic Timed Automata (PTA), Discrete Time Markov Chains (DTMC),
Continuous Time Markov Chains (CTMC), Discrete time Markov Reward Models (DMRM),
Continuous time Markov Reward Models (CMRM), Continuous Time Markov Decision
Processes (CTMDP), Generalized Semi Markovian Process (GSMP), and Stochastic Petri
Nets (SPN). Next, we define a transition system and its probabilistic version. Then, we
introduce SysML behavioral diagrams as a modeling formalism.
2.2.1 Transition Systems
Transition systems [5, 15, 54] are often used as models to describe systems behaviors. Basi-
cally, they are a directed graphs where nodes represent states, and edges model transitions,
i.e., state changes. A state describes some information about a system at a certain moment
of its execution. Definition 2.1 defines formally a transition system.
Definition 2.1 (Transition System). A transition system is a tuple M=(s,S,L,Σ,R), where:
• s is an initial state, such that s ∈ S,
• S is a finite set of states,
• L : S→ 2AP is a labeling function that assigns each state to a set of atomic propositions
taken from the set of atomic propositions (AP),
• Σ is a finite set of actions,
• R ⊆ S×Σ×S is a transition relation.
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2.2.2 Probabilistic Transition Systems
Probabilistic transition systems extend the transition systems to support the probabilis-
tic decision. More specifically, Probabilistic Automata (PAs) [27] are a modeling for-
malism for systems that exhibit both probabilistic and nondeterministic features. Defini-
tion 2.2 illustrates a PA where Dist(S) denotes the set of convex distributions over S and
μ = [. . . ,si → pi, . . .] is a distribution in Dist(S) that assigns a probability pi to a state si.
Definition 2.2 (Probabilistic Automaton). A probabilistic automaton is a tupleM= (s,S,L,
Σ,δ ), where:
• s is an initial state, such that s ∈ S,
• S is a finite set of states,
• L : S→ 2AP is a labeling function that assigns each state to a set of atomic propositions
taken from the set of atomic propositions (AP),
• Σ is a finite set of actions,
• δ : S×Σ→ Dist(S) is a probabilistic transition function assigning for each s∈ S and
α ∈ Σ a probabilistic distribution μ ∈ Dist(S).
Generally, a system is composed of interacting parts. For PAs, this concept is modeled
by the parallel composition as stipulated in Definition 2.3.
Definition 2.3 (Parallel Composition of PAs). The parallel composition of two PAs: M1 =
(s1, S1, L1, Σ1, δ1) and M2 = (s2, S2, L2, Σ2, δ2) is a PAM = ((s1,s2), S1 ×S2, L(s1)∪
L(s2), Σ1 ∪Σ2, δ ), where: δ (S1 ×S2,Σ1 ∪Σ2) is the set of transitions (s1,s2) α−→ μ1 ×μ2
such that one of the following requirements is met.
1. s1
α




−→ μ1,μ2 = [s2 → 1], and α ∈ Σ1\Σ2,
3. μ1 = [s1 → 1], s2 α−→ μ2, and α ∈ Σ2\Σ1.
As example, we present in Figure 2.1 the probabilistic automata of two selected nodes
( Node0 and Node1) from the Probabilistic Broadcast Protocol (PBP)1. Each node has two
































Figure 2.1: The PBP protocol : Node0 (left) and Node1 (right).
2.2.3 SysML Behavioral Diagrams
Here, we explore SysML behavioral diagrams and their composition. The diagrams con-
sidered are: Interaction, State Machine and Activity behavioral diagrams. The interaction
diagram answers the question: “ When does who call whom and how?”, the state machine
diagram answers the question: “ How does an object respond to events in a specific state?”,
and the activity diagram answers the question:“ What happens in which sequence?”.
Interaction diagram. Interaction is a mechanism to describe an abstract communi-
cation between objects of a system. It provides different capabilities that makes it more
appropriate for certain situations (i.e, Sequence Diagrams, Interaction Overview Diagrams,
1http://www.prismmodelchecker.org/benchmarks
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Communication Diagrams, Timing Diagrams and Interaction Tables). SysML uses only
the sequence diagram. The main elements of the syntax of an interaction are: lifelines and
messages. A lifeline represents a communication role and a message is a communication
between two lifelines. For interaction, UML defines branches and loops (alt, opt, break,
and loop), concurrency and order (seq, strict, and par), filters and constraints (critical, neg,
assert, consider, and ignore) operators are set in a combined fragment.
State Machine. A system in a given time, can be seen as a configuration containing
a set of values describing its behavior. The values can be changed when a system reacts to
an event. In UML, we have two kinds of state machines: behavioral state machines and
protocol state machines. The first expresses the behavior of the system, and the second
describes the protocol of a part of that system. Mainly, a state machine contains a set of
states related by transitions. A state is to model a situation where some invariant condition
holds. A transition is a directed relationship specifying the system changes between states.
The sequence of events can be controlled by the following elements: shallow history, deep
history, join, fork, junction, choice, exit point, entry point, and terminate.
Activity Diagram. Activity diagram can be used to model system’s behavior at var-
ious level of abstractions. It allows low-level modeling compared with other behavioral
diagrams [35]. An activity diagram notation can be decomposed into two basic categories:
activity nodes and activity edges. There are three types of activity nodes, which are activity
invocation, object and control nodes. Activity invocation includes receive and send signals,
action, and call-behavior. Activity control nodes are initial, flow final, activity final, deci-
sion, merge, fork, and join nodes. Activity edges are of two types: Control flow and object
flow edges. Control flow edges are used to show the execution path through the activity
diagram and connects activity nodes that are not object nodes. Object flow edges are used
to show the flow of information between activity nodes. More precisely, SysML extends
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system features to UML activity diagram by using stereotype. The stereotype is an extensi-
bility mechanism to define or refine the meaning of a model element. Four system features
are supported in SysML:
• The «probability» stereotype is applied in two ways: (1) Extension of edges leaving
decision nodes, or (2) Object flow edges extension of output parameter sets. It denotes
the likelihood that a value will traverse an edge.
• The «rate» stereotype is applied to an activity edge to specify the expected value of
the number of objects/values that traverse the edge per time interval.
• The «nobuffer» stereotype is applied to object nodes, tokens arriving at the node
are discarded if they are refused by outgoing edges, or refused by actions for object
nodes that are input pins.
• The «overwrite» stereotype is applied to object nodes, a token arriving at a full object
node replaces the ones already there.
Other features supported in behavioral diagrams include: clocks, delay and action non-
deterministic. The Time can be modeled as a time reference that other elements may be
dependent on. A time reference can be established by a local or global clock that produces
continuous or discrete time values. Also, the simple time model in UML can be used to rep-
resent the duration of actions in an activity model. The duration can be notated as constraint
notes in an activity diagram. The nondeterministic choice can be found in “ConditionalN-
ode” which is a generalization of “StructuredActivityNode” [61]. Herein, two attributes
can be defined by the developer “isAssured” and “isDeterminate”. The former asserts that
at least one test will succeed, and the latter asserts that at most one test will succeed. Both
of them are considered false by default.
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Composition in UML and SysML behavioral diagrams. In UML as in SysML,
a behavioral diagram can call others of the same or a different category. For interaction
diagrams, a model can have an association with only one behavioral diagram at a time in a
BehaviorExecutionSpecification element. It is a kind of ExecutionSpecification represent-
ing the execution of a behavior. In state machines, a behavioral diagram can be invoked in a
state or in a transition. During the transition firing, the associated behavioral diagram with
Effect will be executed. In a state, a behavior can be triggered in:
1. Entry, a behavioral diagram is executed whenever entering the state.
2. doActivity, a behavioral diagram is executed while the state is active.
3. Exit, a behavioral diagram is executed whenever this state is exited regardless of
which transition was taken out of the state. If defined, exit actions are always executed
to completion only after all internal activities and transition actions have executed.
For an activity diagram, only one association with another behavior at a time can be applied
in the following activity elements:
1. CallBehavior Action: it is a call action that invokes a behavior directly rather than
invoking a behavioral feature that, in turn, results in the invocation of that behavior.
2. CallOperation Action: it is an action that transmits an operation call request to the
target object, where it may cause the invocation of the associated behavior.
3. DecisionNode: It is a control node that chooses between outgoing flows. It has an as-
sociation in decisionInput to provide input to guard specifications on edges outgoing
from the decision node.
4. ObjectFlow: It is an activity edge to model the flow of values to/or from object nodes
that can have objects or data passing along them. It can have two associations with
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a behavioral diagram in Selection object to select tokens from a source object node,
and in Transformation object to change or replace data tokens flowing along the edge.
5. ObjectNode: It’s an abstract activity node that contains only values at runtime that
conform to the type of the object node. It has an association with a behavioral diagram
in Selection to select tokens for outgoing edges.
In Table 2.1, we compare SysML activity diagrams to some formal models with respect to
the main system features: Probabilistic Choice (PC), Non-Determinism (ND), Clock, Rate,
and Buffer.
Features MDP PTA DTMC CTMC DMRM CMRM CTMDP GSMP SPN SysML
PC          
ND    
Clock       
Rate   
Buffer 
Table 2.1: SysML Activity diagrams Vs. Formal Models
2.3 System Requirements Specification
Here, we describe a logic for specifying requirements of transition-based systems. The
logic uses atomic propositions and connective operators describing properties in states. For
sequences of transitions, temporal logic is used to describe requirements. Two commonly
used temporal logics are Computation Tree Logic (CTL) and Linear Temporal Logic (LTL).
They differ in how they handle branching in the underlying tree structure. In LTL, opera-
tors are intended to describe properties of all possible computation paths, whereas in CTL
temporal operators it is possible to quantify over the paths departing from a given state.
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2.3.1 Temporal Logic
In temporal logic, time is not mentioned explicitly. For CTL, time is modelled as an infinite
tree-like structure with many future paths. The transition system structure can be unwound
into a computational tree. Thus, the future is nondeterministic as any of these paths can
be considered as the future path. Temporal operators are used to reason over the paths and
states of the structure. The operators reason over paths, where A means “along all paths”
and E means “along at least one path”. The second temporal operators that reason over
states, where F means “some future state”, G means “all future states”, U means “until”
and X means “next state”. E is dual to ∃ as A is to ∀ in predicate logic. The syntax of CTL
formulas is defined inductively via a Backus-Naur form [5, 9, 15]:
φ ::=  | ap | φ ∧φ | ¬φ | EXφ | E[φUφ ] | A[φUφ ].
where ap ranges over a countable set of atomic formulas. The symbols ⊥ and  denote
false and true, respectively.
Contrarily to CTL, Time is modelled in LTL as a single infinite future path. Therefore,
LTL has no path quantifiers such as A and E of CTL. However, the temporal operators
that deal with states of the model are the same as those of CTL. It may seem that LTL is
less expressive than CTL. However, this is not true as LTL allows the nesting of boolean
connectives and modalities in a way that is not allowed in CTL. The syntax for LTL is
expressed in BNF as follows [5, 9, 15]:
φ ::=  | ap | φ ∧φ | ¬φ | Xφ | φUφ .
where ap is any atomic proposition. An LTL formula is evaluated on a single path, or on a
set of paths. A formula φ holds on a set of paths if it holds on every path in the set.
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2.3.2 Probabilistic Temporal Logic
To verify probabilistic systems, PCTL [5, 27] is used to express its related specifications.
PCTL is a probabilistic version of CTL. The following BNF represents the PCTL syntax.
φ ::=  | ap | φ ∧φ | ¬φ | P p[ψ]
ψ ::= Xφ | φU≤kφ | φUφ
Where “′′ means true, “ap” is an atomic proposition, k ∈N, p ∈ [0,1], and ∈ {<,≤,>
,≥}. “∧” represents the conjunction operator and “¬” is the negation operator. “X”, “U≤k”,
and “U” are the next, the bounded until, and the until temporal logic operators, respectively.
Other useful operators can be derived such as:
•  ≡ ¬⊥.
• φ1∨φ2 ≡ ¬(¬φ1∧¬φ2).
• φ1 → φ2 ≡ ¬φ1∨φ2.
• φ1 ↔ φ2 ≡ φ1 → φ2∧φ2 → φ1.
• Future: Fφ ≡  U φ or F≤ kφ ≡  U≤ k φ and k ≥ 0.
• Generally: Gφ ≡ ¬(F¬φ) or G≤ kφ ≡ ¬(F≤ k¬φ) and k ≥ 0.
• P≥p[Gφ ] = P≤1−p[F¬φ ].
To specify a satisfaction relation of a PCTL formula in a state “s”, a class of adver-
saries has been defined to solve the nondeterminism in PAs. Hence, a PCTL formula should
be satisfied under all adversaries. The satisfaction relation (|=) of a PCTL formula is de-
fined as follows, where “s” is a state and “π” is a path (sequence of states) obtained by a
memoryless adversary [27].
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• s |= is always satisfied.
• s |= ap⇔ ap ∈ L(s) and L is a labeling function.
• s |= φ1∧φ2 ⇔ s |= φ1∧ s |= φ2.
• s |= ¬φ ⇔ s |= φ .
• s |= P p[ψ]⇔ P({π |π |= ψ})  p.
• π |=Xφ ⇔ π(1) |= φ where π(1) is the second state of π .
• π |= φ1U≤kφ2 ⇔∃i≤ k : ∀ j < i, π( j) |= φ1∧π(i) |= φ2.
• π |= φ1Uφ2 ⇔∃ k ≥ 0 : π |= φ1U≤kφ2.
2.4 Verification Procedures
In this section, we present the verification procedures needed for both non-probabilistic and
probabilistic systems.
2.4.1 Non-Probabilistic Verification
For a transition system M, the verification procedure determines the subset of states from S
that satisfy a CTL formula φ . The algorithm labels the states that satisfy the subformulas
of φ , then labels sequences satisfying the combined subformulas. As example, Algorithm 1
returns the set of states that satisfies the CTL formula E[φ1Uφ2]. First, it looks for the states
that satisfy the formula φ2. Then, it searches backward for states satisfying the formula φ1.
22
Algorithm 1 Procedure of labeling the states satisfying E[φ1Uφ2].
Input: A transition system M, and a CTL property φ = E[φ1Uφ2].
Output: A set of states T ∈ S satisfying φ .
1: procedure CHECKEU(M,φ1 ,φ2)
2: T = {s| f2 ∈ label(s)};
3: for all s ∈ T do
4: label(s) = label(s)∪{E[φ1Uφ2]};
5: end for
6: while T = /0 do
7: choose s ∈ T ;
8: T = T\{s};
9: for all t such that R(t,s) do
10: if E[φ1Uφ2] ∈ label(t) and f1 ∈ label(t) then
11: label(t) = label(t)∪{E[φ1Uφ2]};






The actual probabilistic model checkers such as PRISM are mainly based on the stochastic
version of the classical shortest path problem. This problem was first formulated by Eaton
and Zadeh [11] who called it the problem of pursuit.
In this section, we describe probability computation in a symbolic model checker. It pro-
ceeds by induction on the parse tree of the formula, as in the case of CTL model checking
[15]. To show that, we select MDP defined in Definition 2.4 as a special formalism [27] of
probabilistic automata that exhibits both probabilistic and nondeterministic behaviors.
Definition 2.4 (Markov Decision Process). A Markov decision process (MDP) is a tuple
M = (S,s,αM,δM,L) where:
• S is a finite set of states,
• s is an initial state,
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• αM is a finite alphabet,
• δM : S×αM → Dist (S) is a (partial) probabilistic transition function,
• L : S → 2AP is a labeling function mapping each state to a set of atomic propositions
taken from a set AP.
To reason formally about MDPs, we need a probabilistic space over it. And, as it
is a nondeterministic behavior, the adversary notion is introduced to decide which action
should be chosen in any state of the MDP. In general, the choice is made depending on the
history execution of the MDP. The Definition 2.5 describes the adversary function.
Definition 2.5 (Adversary). An adversary of an MDP M=(S,s,αM,δM,L) is a function
σ :FPathM→ Dist(αM) that maps every finite path of the system into a distribution, where:
• σ(ρ)(a)> 0 only if a ∈ A(last(ρ)),
• FPathM is a finite set of states,
• Dist(αM) is a labeled function assigning to each state of the automaton the set of
atomic propositions that are true in that state.
Reachability analysis is the kernel of a model checker, and probabilistic reachability
refers to the minimum/maximum probability with which a given set of states of a proba-
bilistic system (T ⊆ S) can be reached from a particular state (s). To this end, reachs (T ) is
the set of paths that start from s and contain a state from T , and IPathM,s defines the infinite
paths starting from a state s in M.
reachs (T ) = {π ∈ IPathM,s|π (i) ∈ T and i ∈ N} =
⋃
ρ∈ I{π ∈ IPathM,s|π has prefix ρ},
where I is the (countable) set of all finite paths from s ending in T, and each element of
this union is measurable. This is equivalent to computing the probabilistic bounds of the
24
reached paths:
PminM,s (reachs (T )) = in fσ∈AdvMProb
σ
M,s(s,ψ) (2.1)
PmaxM,s (reachs (T )) = supσ∈AdvMProb
σ
M,s(s,ψ) (2.2)
In fact, finding the probability xs = PminM,s (reachs (T )), s ∈ S is the unique solution of




subject to xs = 1 ∀ s ∈ Ss=1min ,
xs = 0 ∀ s ∈ Ss=0min ,
xs ≤∑δM(s,a)(s′) ·xs′ ∀ s /∈ (Ss=1min ∪ Ss=0min ).
In the case of xs = PmaxM,s (reachs (T )), s ∈ S. It solution is similar to the previous and




subject to xs = 1 ∀ s ∈ Ss=1max,
xs = 0 ∀ s ∈ Ss=0max,
xs ≥∑δM(s,a)(s′) ·xs′ ∀ s /∈ (Ss=1max∪ Ss=0max).
Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis [11], prove that this minimum is the unique solution for Bell-
man’s equation and the successive approximation methods converge to the optimal vector.
This leads to the fact that the linear programming problem can be solved as an equation sys-
tem problem. This means finding the probability xs = PminM,s (reachs (T )), s ∈ S is the unique
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1 if s ∈ Ss=1min
0 if s ∈ Ss=0min
mina∈ A(s)∑δM(s,a)(s′) ·Xs′ Otherwise
(2.3)
The Computing reachability probabilities can be computed through three ways: value
iteration, the linear programming problem or policy iteration. The first one is the most used
methos in practice due to its approximate algorithm that is based on an iterative solution
method which corresponds to a fixed point computation. From practical experience, the
second approach is more scalable than the first one.
2.5 Verification Techniques
The main challenge in model checking is the state explosion problem. To deal with this
problem two approaches exist in literature: Abstraction and Compositional Verification.
2.5.1 Abstraction
Abstraction or compositional minimization refers generally to ignoring some behaviors of
the involved system. Two situations may lead to the use of abstraction:
1. Size of system. The size of a system can grow by the presence of many variables,
concurrency and clocks.
2. Type of system. The disposed model checkers don’t support all systems’ features
such as buffers, channels, and real variables.
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In verification, the abstraction aims to reduce a complex problem M |= φ to a simpler one
M′ |= φ ′ [9]. Many techniques have been introduced and they can be classified in four cate-
gories [9]: abstraction by state merging, abstraction on variables, abstraction by restriction,
and observer automata. The first technique aims at merging states of systems that have sim-
ilar features. Abstraction on variables targets the data in the model and aims at representing
a set of values as one symbolic variable. The third category operates by forbidding some
behaviors of the system. The method of observer automata restricts the system behaviors to
those acceptable by an automaton that observes the system from outside.
2.5.2 Compositional Verification
The main objective of this method is to avoid the construction of the global model of the
system. Each component of the system is verified separately, then the global property can
be inferred directly. Several approaches have been proposed to compositional reasoning
which are: partitioned transition relations, lazy parallel composition, interface processes
and assume-guarantee reasoning. The first and the second compute the set of successors (or
predecessors) of a state set without constructing the transition relation of the global system.
The third one minimizes the global state transition graph by focusing on the communication
among the component processes. The fourth one is described by the formulae (1) for a
system containing two modelsM1 and M2. Their composition satisfies the property φ only
if by assumingM1 satisfies an assumption ϕ then it satisfies φ and ifM2 satisfies ϕ then the
whole system satisfies φ [15].
< ϕ > M1 < φ >
< true> M2 < ϕ > (1)
< true> M1 ‖ M2 < φ >
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Model Checker MDP PTA DTMC CTMC DMRM CMRM CTMDP GSMP SPN
PRISM   
Modest   
MRMC    
UPPAAL PRO 
LiQuor   
VESTA   
Ymer  
SMART   
Table 2.2: Model Checkers vs. Supported Formal Models
2.6 Probabilistic Verification Tools
Here, we compare most existing probabilistic model checkers. Our selection was based on
two main features: the kind of models that they can support, and the temporal logic that
they use to specify a given property.
In the Table 2.2, we compare the model checkers based on their supported model. To
complete the comparison, we show in Table 2.3, the supported temporal logic for each tool.
The most used temporal logics are mainly of probabilistic and stochastic nature such as
Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic (PCTL), Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL), Prob-
abilistic Reward Computation Tree Logic (PRCTL), and Continuous Stochastic Reward
Logic (CSRL). From Table 2.3, we found that only SMART doesn’t support a probabilistic
temporal logic. It supports only LTL and CTL.
From our perspective, PRISM is the most appropriate tool for our propose. It is
open source, and, it supports nondeterminism and probabilistic choice behaviors, also, the
properties have extensions for quantitative and costs/rewards specifications. The specifi-
cations can be expressed either in the probabilistic computation tree logic (PCTL) [5, 27]
or in a continuous stochastic logic. The models can be described using the PRISM lan-
guage as discrete-time Markov chains, continuous-time Markov chains, Markov decision
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Model Checker CSL PCTL PCTL* PRCTL CSRL
PRISM   
Modest   
MRMC    
UPPAALPRO   




Table 2.3: Model Checkers vs. Supported Temporal Logic
processes (MDPs) or probabilistic timed automata. PRISM also supports probabilistic au-
tomata (PAs), but for simplicity, PRISM refers to PAs by MDPs [27]. For the verification
efficiency, the constructed models can be stored as binary decision diagrams (BDDs) and
multi-terminal BDDs. In addition, PRISM has built-in symmetry reduction and implements
iterative numerical computations to overcome the state explosion problem [5, 27].
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced the main background and concepts needed in the rest of the
thesis. Also, we presented a comparison between the existing semantic models, temporal
logics, the verification techniques, and existing tools. In the next chapter, we propose a
model-checking based methodology for the verification of SysML activity diagrams.
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Chapter 3
Verification of SysML Activity Diagrams
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we are interested in the formal verification of systems modeled by using
SysML activity diagrams. These diagrams can call and communicate with other diagrams,
and allow for probabilistic behavior specification. Our proposed verification framework is
depicted in Figure 3.1. It takes a composition of SysML activity diagrams and a set of PCTL
properties as input. Our framework is based on extracting the formal semantics of SysML
activity diagrams. This helps to easily express the diagrams in the input language of the
used model checker. From our comparative studies of Chapter 2, we selected PRISM as a
verification engine. Herein, we express SysML activity diagrams in PRISM input language.
Then, we use PRISM model checker to verify PCTL properties on the obtained PRISM
model. To prove the soundness of our verification approach, we compare the underlying
semantics of both the SysML activity diagrams and their generated PRISM code. We found
that the probabilistic equivalence relation between both semantics preserve the satisfaction
of all PCTL operators.















Figure 3.1: A Probabilistic Verification Framework.
using our framework. It represents the ATM SysML activity diagram that is composed
of the main diagram “Figure 3.2-(a)” and its call behavior diagram “Figure 3.2-(b)”. Our
goal is to measure the minimum probability of authorizing a transaction after inserting a
card. By using our verification approach, we found the probability value that satisfies this
requirement is 0.84.
(a) Main ATM Diagram. (b) Transaction Call Behavior.
Figure 3.2: ATM SysML Activity Diagram.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 and Section 3.3
describes and formalizes SysML activity diagrams, respectively. The semantics of PRISM
models is presented in Section 3.4. Our verification framework is detailed in Section 3.5 and
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its soundness is proved in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 describes the experimental results and
Section 3.8 surveys the existing related work. Finally, Section 3.9 concludes this chapter.
3.2 SysML Activity Diagrams
SysML activity diagrams are graph-based diagrams where activity nodes are connected by
activity edges. They consist of three types of artifacts: activity nodes, activity control nodes,
and activity edges. In our work, we take into consideration the artifacts that are illustrated
in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: SysML Activity Diagram Artifacts.
Activity nodes have three types: activity invocation, object and control nodes. Ac-
tivity invocation includes receive and send signals (or objects), actions, and call behaviors.
Activity control nodes can be initial, flow final, activity final, decision, merge, fork, and join
nodes. Activity edges are of two types: control flow and object flow. Control flow edges
are used to show the execution path through the activity diagram and object flow edges are
used to show the flow of data between activity nodes. Concurrency and synchronization are
modeled using forks and joins, whereas, branching is modeled using decision and merge
nodes. While a decision node specifies a choice between different possible paths based on
the evaluation of a guard condition (and/or a probability distribution), a fork node indicates
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the beginning of multiple parallel control threads. More specifically, UML 2.0 [61] activity
forks model unrestricted parallelism. Thus, a token evolves asynchronously according to
an interleaving semantics. Moreover, a merge node specifies a point from where different
incoming control paths follow the same path, whereas a join node allows multiple parallel
control threads to synchronize and rejoin.
Initially, when a SysML activity diagram is invoked, its initial node is activated. Then,
the activation of any other node depends only on the deactivation of its predecessor node
and the guard satisfaction of its input edge. In addition, the call behavior action or the
decision node can consume its input tokens to invoke its specified behavior. In this case,
the invocation supports both synchronous and asynchronous calls. In the asynchronous
case, the execution of the invoked behavior proceeds without any further dependency on
the execution of the activity containing the invoking artifact. But in the synchronous case,
the execution of the calling artifact is blocked until it receives a reply token from the invoked
behavior. In the case of the decision node, when the invoked behavior enables more than
one guard; the nondeterminism mechanism is adopted.
3.3 SysML Activity Diagram Formalization
In this section, we formalize SysML activity diagrams by providing an adequate calculus
that helps to formalize and prove the soundness of our approach.
3.3.1 Syntax of SysML Activity Diagrams
Based on the textual specification in the UML superstructure standard [61] and the SysML
specification standard [60], we formalize SysML activity diagrams by developing a calculus
called “New Activity Calculus (NuAC)”. In Table 3.1, each SysML activity diagram artifact
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is described and represented by its NuAC term.
Artifacts NuAC Terms Description
l : ιN Initial node is activated when a diagram is invoked.
l : Activity final node stops the diagram execution.
l : Flow final node kills its related path execution.
  l : aN Action node defines an atomic action execution.
l : a ↑A N Call behavior node invokes a new behavior.
l : a!vN Send node is used to send a signal/object.
l : a?vN Receive node is used to receive a signal/object.
Decision node with a call behavior A ,
l :D(A , p,g, a convex distribution {p,1− p}
N ,N ) and guarded edges {g,¬g}.
l :M(x)N Merge node specifies the continuation
or l and x= {x1,x2} is a set of input flows.
Fork node models the concurrency that begins
l : F(N1,N2) multiple parallel control threads. UML 2.0
activity forks model unrestricted parallelism.
l : J(x)N Join node presents the synchronization
or l where x= {x1,x2} is a set of input pins.
Table 3.1: NuAC Terms of SysML Activity Diagrams Artifacts.
The NuAC syntax presented in Figure 3.4 optimizes the syntax in [18] by eliminating
the redundant terms. Also, NuAC exploits the commutativity and the associativity prop-
erties for multi-input/output nodes that are described by Property 3.1 and Property 3.2,
respectively. These properties allow handling multiplicity by considering only two input-
s/outputs. Furthermore, NuAC covers more important behaviors such as: behavior calls,
and communication by sending and receiving messages (signals or objects).
Property 3.1 (Commutativity). In a SysML activity diagram A ; fork, join, decision, and
merge nodes are commutative.
• l : F(N1,N2) = l : F(N2,N1).
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A ::= ε | l : ιnN
N ::=N | l : F(N ,N ) | l : D(A , p,g,N ,N ) |
l | l : X nN | l :  | l :
X ::= aB | J(x1,x2) | M(x1,x2)
B ::=↑A | !v | ?v | ε
Figure 3.4: Syntax of New Activity Calculus (NuAC).
• l : J(x1,x2)N = l : J(x2,x1)N .
• ∀p ∈]0,1[, l : D(A , p,g,N1,N2) = l : D(A ,1− p,¬g,N2,N1).
• l :M(x1,x2)N = l :M(x2,x1)N .
Property 3.2 (Associativity). In a SysML activity diagram A ; fork, join, decision, and
merge nodes are associative.
• l : F(l′ : F(N1,N2),N3) = l : F(N1, l′′ : F(N2,N3)).
• l : J(x1, l′ : J(x2,x3))N = l : J(l′′ : J(x1,x2),x3)N .
• ∀p, p′ ∈]0,1[, l : D(A , p,N1, l′ : D(A ′, p′,N2,N3))
= l :D(F(A ,A ′), p+ p′ − p.p′, l′′ : D( pp+p′−p.p′ ,N1,N2),N3).
• ∀p, p′ ∈]0,1[, l : D(A , p,g,N1, l′ : D(A ′, p′,g′,N2,N3)) = l : D(F(A ,A ′),
(p,g,N1),(p′(1− p),¬g∧g′,N2),((1− p′)(1− p),¬g∧¬g′,N3).
• l :M(x1, l′ :M(x2,x3))N = l :M(l′′ :M(x1,x2),x3)N .
In NuAC syntax, we can distinguish two main syntactic concepts: marked and un-
marked terms. A marked NuAC term corresponds to an activity diagram with tokens. But,
the unmarked NuAC term corresponds to the static structure of the diagram. A marked
term is typically used to denote a reachable state that is characterized by the set of tokens’
locations in a given term.
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To support multiple tokens, we augment the “overbar” operator with an integer n
such that N n denotes a term marked with n tokens with the convention that N 1 =N and
N
0
=N . Multiple tokens are needed when there are loops that encompass in their body
a fork node. Furthermore, we use a prefix label “l” for each node to uniquely reference it
in the case of a backward flow connection. Particularly, labels are useful for connecting
multiple incoming flows towards merge and join nodes. Let L be a collection of labels
ranged over by l0, l1, · · · and N be any node in the activity diagram. We write l : N
to denote an l-labeled activity node N . It is important to note that nodes with multiple
incoming edges (e.g. join and merge) are visited as many times as they have incoming
edges. Thus, as a syntactic convention we use only a label (i.e. l) to express a NuAC term
if its related node is encountered already. We denote by D(g,N ,N ) and D(p,N ,N ) to
express the guarded and the probabilistic decisions without any behavior invocation.
3.3.2 Semantics of SysML Activity Diagrams
To give a meaning to the execution of SysML activity diagrams, we use structural oper-
ational semantics to formally describe how the computation steps of NuAC atomic terms
take place. NuAC derivation rules are based on the informally specified locus of control
rules defined in the standard [61].
We define Σ as the set of non-empty actions labeling the transitions (i.e. the alphabet
of NuAC, to be distinguished from action nodes in activity diagrams). An element α ∈ Σ
is the label of the executing active node. Let Σ include the empty action denoted by ε and
p be probability values such that p ∈]0,1]. The general form of a transition is A α−→p A ′.
The probability value specifies the likelihood of a given transition to occur and it is denoted
by P(A ,α,A ′). The case of p= 1 presents a non-probabilistic transition and it is denoted
simply by A α−→ A ′. For simplicity, we denote by A [N ] to specify N as a sub-term of
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A and by |A | to specify a term A without tokens. For the call behavior case of a ↑N , we
denote A [a ↑ A ′] by A ↑a A ′. In the sequel, we describe the operational semantic rules
of the NuAC calculus.
INT-1 l : ιN ε−→ l : ιN
This axiom introduces the execution of A by putting a token on ι .
INT-2 l : ιN l−→ l : ιN
This axiom propagates the token in the marked term ι into its outgoing N .
ACT-1 l : amN n l−→ l : am+1N
n−1
∀n> 0, m≥ 0
ACT-2 l : am+1N
n l







l : amN n α−→p l : amN ′
n
∀n,m≥ 0
The ACT-1 axiom introduces the execution of an action a and ACT-2 shows its execu-
tion propagation to the succeeding behaviorN . The derivation rule ACT-3 illustrates
the evolution of the term l : amN n when the action α in the term N is executed
with a probability p.
BEH-0 l : a ↑A nN l−→ l : a ↑A n−1N ∀ n> 0
BEH-1 A = l
′ : ιN ′ A ′ = l′ : ιN ′ ∀ n> 0




−→ |A | ∀n≥ 0
l : a ↑A nN l
′
















The BEH-1 axiom introduces the execution of the behavior A called by a. The
derivation rule BEH-2 finishes the execution of a call behavior and moves the token to
the succeeding term N . The derivation rules BEH-3 and BEH-4 present the effect on
a ↑A nN when A or N executes an action α with a probability p, respectively.







l : F(N ,N )n α−→p l : F(N ′,N )
n
The FRK-1 axiom shows the multiplicity of the arriving tokens according to the out-
going sub-terms. The FRK-2 derivation rule illustrates the changes on a fork term
when its outgoing execute an action α with a probability p.
DEC-1 l :D(g,N ,N )n l,g−→ l : D(g,N ,N )
n−1
∀n> 0
DEC-2 l :D(p,g,N ,N )n l,g−→p l :D(p,g,N ,N )
n−1
∀ n> 0
DEC-3 A = l
′ : ιN ′ A ′ = l′ : ιN ′ ∀ n> 0




−→ |A | ∀ n> 0
l :D(A , p,g,N ,N )n l
′,g






l :D(A , p,g,N ,N ′′)n α−→p l : D(A , p,g,N ′,N ′′)
n
The axiom DEC-1 describes a guarded decision where a token flows through the edge
satisfying its guard g. Contrary, DEC-2 describes a probabilistic decision where a
token flows with a probability p through the edge satisfying its related guard g. DEC-
3 axiom shows a transition of probability one to initiate an invoked behavior. DEC-4
derivation rule shows the termination of a behavior with a transition of probability
one and shows how a token can flow from a behavior call execution to a guarded path
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(or unguarded) with a probability value (or without probability value). DEC-6 shows
the evolution of a decision term when one of its behaviors is changed.
MRG-1 l : N  l′ :M(x,y)
n l
−→ l : N  l′ :M(x,y)n ∀ n≥ 0
MRG-2 l :M(x,y)N l−→ l :M(x,y)N
MRG-3 A [l :M(x,y)N , lx]
o





l :M(x,y)N α−→p l :M(x,y)N ′
MRG-1 is a transition with a probability of value 1 to put a token coming from the
sub-term N on a merge labeled by l. MRG-2 is a transition with a probability of
value 1 to present a token flowing from a merge node labeled by l to the sub-term N .
MRG-2 fuses labels referring to the same merge node. The derivation rule MRG-3
presents the subsequence of l :M(x,y)N when N executes an action α with a
probability of value p.
JON-1 l : N  l′ : J(x,y)
n l
−→ l : N  l′ : J(x,y)n ∀ n≥ 0
JON2 l : J(x,y)N l−→ l : J(x,y)N
JON-3 A [l : J(x,y)N , lx]
l





l : J(x,y)N α−→p l : J(x,y)N ′
JON-1 and JON-2 are axioms representing a transition with a probability of value 1
to activate the pin x in a join labeled by l and to move a token in join to the sub-term
N , respectively. JON-3 fuses labels referring to the same join. The derivation rule
JON-4 presents the subsequence of l : J(x,y)N when N executes an action α
with a probability p.
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SND l : a!vnN l−→ l : a!vn−1N ∀n> 0
SND describes the evolution of the token after sending an object v.
REC l
′ : a!vmN ′ l
′
−→ l′ : a!vm−1N ′ ∀n, m≥ 1
l : a?vnN l−→ l : a?vn−1N
REC describes the reception of an object v just after sending it which is a synchro-
nization communication.




−→ l : a!vn−1N l′ : a?vmN2
l′
−→ l′ : a?vm−1N2
A [l : a!vnN , l′ : a?vm−1N2]−→A [l : a!v
n
N1, l′ : a?v
m−1
N2]
COM describes sending and receiving an object v.







This axiom states that if the sub-term l :
⊗
is reached in A then a transition of
probability one is enabled to produce a term describing the termination of a flow.
AFin A [l :] l−→ |A |
























The ACT3, BEH-3, BEH-4, FRK2, DEC5, MRG4, JON4, PRG1 derivation rules
preserve the evolution when a sub-term N evolves to N ′ by executing the action
α with a probability p. The PRG2 derivation rule describes the interleaving between
two terms N1 and N2.
The semantics of SysML activity diagrams expressed using A is the result of the defined
inference rules. The NUAC semantics can be described in terms of a PA as stipulated by
Definition 3.1.
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Definition 3.1 (NuAC-PA). A probabilistic automaton of an activity calculus term A is a
tupleMA = (s, L, S, Σ,Steps), where:
• s is an initial state, such that L(s)=l : ιN ,
• L : S→ 2{A } is a labeling function that assigns for each state an A marked term,
• S is a finite set of states reachable from s, such that, S = {si:0≤ i ≤ n|L(si) ∈ {A }},
• Σ is a finite set of actions corresponding to the labels in A ,
• Steps : S×Σ → 2Dist(S) is a (partial) probabilistic transition function such that:
– ∀s ∈ S, and α ∈ Σ: Steps(s) =
{〈α,μ〉|s α−→ μ}, Stepsα(s) = {μ ∈ Dist(S)|〈α,μ〉 ∈ Steps(s)} where Dist(S)
is a set of convex probability distributions over S.
– If Steps(s) = /0 then s is the terminal state.
3.4 PRISM Formalization
In this section, we formalize PRISM by presenting its syntax and semantics. In our formal-
ization, we focus more on the probabilistic automata model in PRISM.
Generally, a probabilistic system “S” that is described as a PRISM program “P” that
comprises a set of n modules (n > 0), the state of each one is defined by the evaluation
of a countable set of finite-ranging local variables. The global state of the system is the
evaluation of the local variables (Vl) and the global ones (Vg) denoted by V =Vg∪ Vl. The
behavior of each module is a set of guarded commands.
A guarded command describes the main changes of P behaviors. It takes the fol-
lowing form: [a] g → p1 : u1+...+pm : um , or, [a] g → u, which means, for the action
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“a” if the guard “g” is true, then, an update “ui” is enabled with a probability “pi”. For
the second case, for the action “a” if the guard “g” is true, then, the update “u” is en-
abled. A guard is a logical proposition consisting of variables evaluation and proposi-
tional logic operators. The update “ui” is an evaluation of variables expressed as a con-
junction of assignments: (v′j = val j)& · · ·&(v′k = valk) where vi are local variables and
vali are values evaluated via expressions denoted by “eval” that requires type consistency
(eval :Vl → N∪{true, f alse}). A command is formally defined in Definition 3.2.
Definition 3.2 (PRISM Command). A PRISM command is a tuple c= (a,g,u), where:
• a: is an action label,
• g: is a predicate over V ,
• u= {(pi,ui)|m> 1,0 < pi < 1,∑mi=1 pi = 1 and ui = {(v,eval(v)) : v ∈Vl}}
∪{(v,eval(v)) : v ∈Vl}.
A module that describes the behavior of a sub-part of a system can be considered as
a set of commands. The variables of each module are declared and initialized locally. A
module is formally defined in Definition 3.3.
Definition 3.3 (PRISM Module). A PRISM module “M” is a tupleM = (Vl, Il,C), where:
• Vl is a finite set of local variables associated to the moduleM,
• Il is the initial values of Vl,
• C= {ci : 0≤ i≤ k} is a finite set of commands that defines the behavior of the PRISM
moduleM.
To describe the composition between modules, PRISM uses the following Commu-
nicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [34] operators.
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1. Synchronization: It is a parallel composition of modules. For two modules M1 and
M2, their synchronization is denoted by M1||M2 and they can synchronize only on
actions appearing in bothM1 and M2.
2. Interleaving: It is an asynchronous parallel composition of modules that are fully
interleaved without synchronization. M1 interleaves withM2 is denoted by M1|||M2.
3. Parallel Interface: It is a restricted parallel composition of modules. The modules
synchronize only on shared actions. For example, let {a,b, · · ·} be the set of shared
actions between M1 and M2, the interface parallel composition of M1 and M2 in
{a,b, · · ·} is denoted by: M1|[a,b, · · · ]|M2.
Other useful CSP operators supported by PRISM are hiding and renaming:
1. Hiding: This operation permits to hide actions in a module. We denote by
M/{a,b, · · ·} to hide actions a, b, · · · in the moduleM.
2. Renaming: This operator facilitates rewriting the behavior of a module by renaming
its actions. We denote by M{a← b,c← d, · · ·} to rename actions a by b, c by d, · · ·
in the moduleM.
As a result, Definition 3.4 stipulates formally a system containing n modules and
combined by a CSP algebraic expression.




i=1Vli is a finite set of the union of global and local variables,
• I = IG
⋃
Il is a finite set of the initial values of global (IG) and local (Il) variables,
• exp is a set of global logic expressions,
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• M1, . . . ,Mn is a countable set of modules,
• CSPexp is a CSP algebraic expression.
3.4.1 PRISM Syntax
The PRISM syntax of a probabilistic automata is defined by the BNF grammar presented
in Figure 3.5. To clarify PRISM syntax, we define the following:
• [min..max] is a range of values such that min, max ∈N and min < max.
• p ∈ ]0..1[ is a probability value.
• eval is an evaluation expression that can be composed of the following operators:
−(unary minus),+,−,∗,/,<,<=,>=,>,=,=, !,&, |,<=>,=>,?(g ? a : b).
• val ∈N
⋃
{true, f alse} is a value given by the function eval.
• v is a string describing a variable (v ∈V ) and init(v) is its initial value.
• name is a string label describing the module name. For the module i, its name label
is denoted byMi.
• CSPexp is a CSP expression composed of the following operators ||, |||, |[a,b, · · ·]|,
/{a,b, · · ·}, and {a← b,c← d, · · ·}.
3.4.2 PRISM Semantics
The probabilistic automata of a PRISM program P is based on the atomic semantics of a
command “c” denoted by [[c]]. The latter is a set of transitions defined as follows: [[c]] =
{(s,a,μ) | s |= g} where μ is a distribution over S such that μ(s′) = {|0 < pi ≤ 1 : ∀v ∈
V, s′(v) = evali(V )|}.
44
P ::=MDP <Variables> < eval > <Modules> < System>
<Variables> ::=ε
| < kindVariables> v: <VariablesType> init init(v);<Variables>
< kindVariables> ::=ε |global
<VariablesType> ::= bool | int | [min..max]
<Modules> ::= module name <Variables> <ModuleBehavior> endmodule
<ModuleBehavior> ::=ε |[a] g→< update> ;<ModuleBehavior>
< update> ::=< p>< eval >; | < p >< eval > + < update>
< eval > ::=(v′ = eval(V )) | (v’=eval(V))&< eval >
< p> ::=ε | p :
< System> ::=system < AlgebraExpressions> endsystem
< AlgebraExpressions> ::= ε | name CSPexp name;< AlgebraExpressions>
Figure 3.5: The Syntax of PRISM Probabilistic Automata.
Definition 3.5 stipulates the formal definition of PRISM probabilistic automata de-
noted by MP. The states of MP take the form 〈V1, · · · ,Vn,eval〉. The stepwise behavior of
MP is described by the operational semantic rules provided as follows.
INIT 〈Vi, init(Vi)〉 −→ 〈Vi([[init(Vi)]]),−〉
INIT initializes variables. For a module Mi, init returns the initial value of the local
variable v j ∈Vi.
LOOP 〈Vi,−〉 −→ 〈Vi〉
This axiom presents a loop in a state without changing variables’ evaluations. It can
be applied to avoid a deadlock.
UPDATE 〈Vi,v′i = eval(V )〉 −→ 〈Vi([[vi]])〉
UPDATE axiom describes the execution of a simple assignment for a given variable
vi. Its evaluation is updated in Vi ofMi.
CNJ-UPD 〈Vi,v′i = eval(V )∧ v′j = eval(V )〉 −→ 〈Vi([[vi]], [[v j]])〉
CNJ-UPD implements the conjunction of a set of assignments.
PRB-UPD1 〈Vi, pi : v′i = eval(V )〉 −→pi 〈Vi([[vi]])〉 0 < pi ≤ 1
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PRB-UPD2 〈Vi, pi : v′i = eval(V )∧ v′j = eval(V )〉 −→pi 〈Vi([[vi,v j]])〉0 < pi ≤ 1
PRB-UPD1 and PRB-UPD2 describe probabilistic updates.
ENB-CMD1
V |= g
〈V,M([a]g→ ∑i pi : ui)〉 a−→ μ
ENB-CMD1 enables the execution of a probabilistic command.
ENB-CMD2 V |= g V |= g
′
〈V, [a]g→ u; [a′]g′ → u′〉 a−→ 〈V ([[u]]), [a′]g→ u′〉
ENB-CMD2 enables the execution of a command in a module.
ENB-CMD3 V |= g∧g
′
〈V, [a]g→ u; [a′]g→ u′〉 −→ 〈V ([[u]]), [a′]g′ → u′〉
ENB-CMD3 solves the nondeterminism in a module by following a policy.
SYNC 〈Vi,ci〉
a












INTERL derivation rule describes the interleaving between modules.
Definition 3.5 (PRISM-PA). A probabilistic automaton of a PRISM program P is a tuple
MP = (si, S, L, Σ, δ ) where:
• si is an initial state, such that L(si)=[[init(V)]],
• S is a finite set of states reachable from s, such that, S = {si:0≤ i ≤ n|L(si) ∈ {AP}},
• L : S→ 2AP is a labeling function that assigns for each state a set of valuated propo-
sitions,
• Σ is a finite set of actions,
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• δ : S×Σ → Dist(S) is a (partial) probabilistic transition function assigning for each
s ∈ S and α ∈ Σ a probabilistic distribution μ ∈ Dist(S). μ is a convex combination
of distributions. Distr(S) denotes the set of (sub) distributions over S. δ defines
non deterministic and probabilistic steps as follows: Steps(s)={〈a,μ〉 : s a−→ μ} and
Stepsa(s) = {μ ∈ Dist(S) : 〈a,μ〈∈ Steps(s)}.
3.5 The Verification of SysML Activity Diagrams
This section describes the transformation of SysML activity diagrams A into a PA written
in PRISM input language. Algorithm 2 illustrates the transformation algorithm T that takes
A as input and returns its PRISM code image denoted by PrismCode. The diagram A
is visited using a depth-first search procedure and the algorithm’s output produces PRISM
synchronized modules. The algorithm is described as follows. First, the initial node is
pushed into the stack of nodes denoted by nodes (line 5). While the stack is not empty (line
6-17), the algorithm pops a node from the stack into the current node denoted by cNode
(line 7). The current node is added into the list vNode of visited nodes (line 9) if it is not
already visited (line 8). PrismCode is constructed by calling the function Γ that has two
arguments which are the current node and its successors (line 11). The explored successors
are pushed into the stack nodes (line 13-15). The algorithm terminates the execution when
all nodes are visited.
The mapping function Γ presented in Listing 3.1produces the appropriate PRISM
command for the current node. The action label of the command is the label of the current
node. The guard of this command depends on how the current node can be activated,
therefore, a boolean expression as a flag is assigned to define this activation. The variables
of each module are locals of type boolean initialized to false except for the initial node that
is initialized to true. It marks the first token produced by the rule “INT-1”. Generally, the
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Algorithm 2 Transformation Algorithm T of SysML Activity Diagrams into PRISM Code
Input: SysML activity diagrams A .
Output: PRISM code PrismCode.
1: nodes as Stack;  A stack of nodes which is initially empty.
2: cNode as Node;  The current node which is initially empty.
3: nNode, vNode as list_of_ Node;  List of nodes that are initially empty.
4: procedure T(A )
5: nodes.push(in);  Read the initial node.
6: while not nodes.empty() do
7: cNode := nodes.pop();  Pop the current node.
8: if cNode not in vNode then
9: vNode.add(cNode);  Consider the current node as a visited node.
10: nNode := cNode.successors();  Get the successors of the current node.
11: PrismCode.add(Γ(cNode,nNode));  Call the mapping rules function.
12: end if
13: for all n in nNode do  Stores all newly discovered nodes in the stack.
14: nodes.push(n);
15: end for
16: nNode.clear();  Empty the list nNode.
17: end while
18: end procedure
updates deactivate the propositions of the current node and activate that the ones related to
its successors. For a node n, we define three useful functions: L(n), S(n) and E(n) that
return the label, the start and the end of its related call behaviors, respectively.
Now, we calculate the time complexity of the algorithm T for a SysML activity di-
agram A of n nodes (we consider n as the maximum number of nodes supported by A ).
In Algorithm 2, the while loop can run at most n times (line 6). Recursively, Γ can recall
the algorithm T when a call behavior node exists. This mechanism of recalling produces a
hierarchical form of diagrams where each node can call a new SysML activity diagram. We
introduce the notion of hierarchy depth denoted by k, which means the level in the hierarchy
from where a node has a call behavior. The worst case is that for any level of the hierarchy,
each node can call a new behavior. The computing complexity of T is of class P with a
worst case running time of O(nk).
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1 Γ : A → P
2 Γ (A ) = ∀n ∈A , Case (n ) of
3 l : ιN ⇒
4 in
5 {[l]l −→ (l′ =⊥)&(L(N )′ =);}∪Γ(N )
6 end
7 l :M(x,y)N ⇒
8 in
9 {[lx ]lx −→ (l′x =⊥)&(L(N )′ =);}
10 ∪{[ly ]ly −→ (l′y =⊥)&(L(N )′ =);}∪Γ(N )
11 end
12 l : J(x,y)N ⇒
13 in
14 {[l]lx ∧ ly −→ (l′x =⊥)&(l′y =⊥)&(L(N )′ =);}∪Γ(N )
15 end
16 l : F(N1,N2) ⇒
17 in





21 l : aBN , Case (B ) of
22 ↑A ⇒
23 in
24 {[ls ]l→ (l′ =);}









34 {[L(a?v)]l&¬L(a!v) −→ (l′ =);}








42 l : D(A , p,g,N1 ,N2) ⇒
43 Case (A ) of
44 ε ⇒
45 Case ( p ) of
46 ]0,1[ ⇒
47 in
48 {[l]l −→ p : (l′ =⊥)&(l′g =)+(1− p) : (l′ =⊥)&(l′¬g =);}
49
⋃
{[lg]lg ∧g −→ (l′g =⊥)&(L(N1)′ =);}
50
⋃







55 {[l]l −→ (l′ =⊥)&(L(g)′ =);}
56
⋃
{[l]l −→ (l′ =⊥)&(L(¬g)′ =);}
57
⋃
{[lg]lg ∧g −→ (l′g =⊥)&(L(N1)′ =);}
58
⋃





61 O t h e r w i s e
62 in
63 {[ls ]l→ (l′ =);}∪Γ′(A );
64 ∪{[le ]l&L(E(A ))→ (l′ =⊥)&(L(D(p,g,N1,N2))′ =);}
65 ∪Γ(l : D(p,g,N1 ,N2))
66 end
67 l : ⇒
68 in
69 [l]l −→ (l′ =⊥);
70 end
71 l : ⇒
72 in
73 [l]l −→ &l∈L (l′ =⊥);
74 end
75 / / D e f i n i n g t h e f u n c t i o n Γ′(A )
76 Γ′ : A → P
77 Γ′(A ) = ∀m ∈A : L(m) =⊥ , Case (m ) of
78 lι : ιN ⇒
50
79 in
80 {[ls]l→ (L(S(A ))′ =);
81 [L(S(A ))]L(S(A ))−→ (L(S(A ))′ =⊥)&(L(N )′ =);}∪Γ(N )
82 end
83 l : ⇒
84 in
85 [le]l&L(E(A ))→ &l∈L ′ (l′ =⊥);
86 end
87 O t h e r w i s e Γ(A );
Listing 3.1: Generating PRISM Commands Function.
3.6 The Soundness of the Verification Approach
Our aim is to prove the soundness of our transformation algorithm T and to show that
it preserves PCTL properties. Let A be a NuAC term and MA be its corresponding PA
constructed by the NuAC operational semantics denoted by S such that S (A ) = MA .
The function Γ is defined previously to implement the transformation rules that produce a
PRISM programP such that Γ(A ) =P . For the programP , letMP be its corresponding
PA constructed by the PRISM operational semantics denoted by S ′ such that S ′(P) =
MP . As illustrated in Figure 3.6, proving the soundness of Γ algorithm is to find the







Figure 3.6: Mapping Soundness.
To define the relationMA R MP , we have to establish a step by step correspondence
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between MA and MP . First, we introduce the notion of the probabilistic strong bisimula-
tion relation. This relation is based on the probabilistic equivalence relation R defined in
Definition 3.6 where X/R denotes the quotient space of X with respect to R and ≡R is the
lifting of R to a probabilistic space.
Definition 3.6 (The equivalence ≡R). If R is an equivalence on X , then the induced equiv-
alence ≡R on Dist(X) is given by: μ ≡R μ ′ iff μ[C]≡R μ ′[C] for allC ∈ X/R.
Hence, Definition 3.7 stipulates the probabilistic strong bisimulation relation.
Definition 3.7 (Strong Probabilistic Bisimulation). A strong probabilistic bisimulation be-
tween two probabilistic automataM1 andM2 is an equivalence relationR  S1× S2 where:
1. Each initial state ofM1 is related to at least one initial state ofM2;
2. For each pair of states s1Rs2 and each transition s1
a
−→ μ1 of M1 of either M1 or M2,
there exists a transition s2
a
−→ μ2 of eitherM1 orM2, such that μ1 ≡R μ2.
Here, R is the lifting of R to a probability space. It is achieved by finding a weight
function [79] that associates each state of M1 with others in M2 by a certain probability
value. The weight function is defined below in Definition 3.8.
Definition 3.8 (Weight Function). Given two sets of states S1 and S2. Let R  S1 × S2,
μ1 ∈ Dist(S1) and μ2 ∈ Dist(S2) are two distributions over S1 and S2. A weight function
for (μ1,μ2) w.r.t. R is a function  : S1× S2 → [0,1] such that:
1. ∀ s1 ∈ S1 : Σs2∈S2(s1,s2) = μ1(s1),
2. ∀ s2 ∈ S2 : Σs1∈S1(s1,s2) = μ2(s2),
3. (s1,s2)> 0 ⇒ s1Rs2.
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For our proof, we stipulate herein the mapping relation R denoted by MARMP
between a NuAC term A and its corresponding PRISM term P .
Definition 3.9 (Mapping Relation). The relation MARMP between a NuAC term A and
a PRISM term P such that Γ(A ) =P is a strong probabilistic bisimulation relation.
Finally, proving that Γ is sound means showing the existence of a strong probabilistic
bisimulation between MA and MP .
Lemma 3.1 (Soundness). The mapping algorithm Γ is sound, i.e. MA R MP .
Proof. Our abstraction is sound and the proof is provided in Appendix B.4.
In the following, we show that the mapping relation preserves the satisfaction of
PCTL properties. This means, if a PCTL property is satisfied in the resulting model by a
mapped function Γ then it is satisfied by the original one.
Proposition 3.1 (PCTL Preservation). For two PAs MA and MP such that Γ(A ) = P
where MA R MP . For a PCTL property φ , then: (MA |= φ)⇔ (MP |= φ).
Proof. Our abstraction is sound and the proof is provided in Appendix B.4.
3.7 Experimental Results
In this section, we apply our verification framework on the online shopping system [32] and
the Real Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP) 1 hypothetical application. The related SysML
1http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2326
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activity diagrams are modeled on Topcased2 then mapped into Prism code via our Java im-
plementation. In the purpose of providing experimental results demonstrating the efficiency
and the validity of our approach, we verify a set of functional requirements of the system
under study.
3.7.1 Online Shopping System
The online shopping system aims at providing services for purchasing online items. Figure
3.7a illustrates the corresponding SysML activity diagram. It contains four call-behavior
actions3, which are: “Browse Catalogue”, “Make Order”, “Process Order” and “Shipment”.
As example, Figure 3.7b expands the call behavior action “Process Order”.
(a) Online Shopping System. (b) Process Order.
Figure 3.7: The Online Shopping System SysML Activity Diagram.
In order to check the correctness of the online shopping system, we propose to verify
four functional requirements. They are expressed in PCTL as follows where n (n ∈ [0..K])
2http://www.topcased.org Toolkit in OPen source for Critical Applications and SystEms Development.
3Each call-behavior action is represented by its proper diagram.
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and m represent the order and the shipment numbers, respectively.
1. For each order, what is the minimum probability value to make a delivery?
PCTL: Pmin=?[(n≤ K) U (Delivery)].
2. After browsing the catalogue, what is the minimum probability value to ship a se-
lected item?
PCTL: Pmin=?[((SelectItem∧m= n∧m≤ K)⇒ F(Delivery))⇒ F(Shipment)].
3. For a given customer, what is the maximum probability value to make a new order
after confirming the bill?
PCTL: Pmax=?[G((Con f irmBill)⇒ F(MakeOrder))].
4. For each order, what is the maximum probability value to enter a wrong credit card
code?
PCTL: Pmax=?[(n= m)⇒ (!CardOk))].
The verification results of the above four properties are shown in Figure 3.8. For
different values of the maximum number of orders “K”, Figure 3.8a shows that the verifi-
cation result for Property 1 converges to 0.9977 after three steps. Figure 3.8b presents the
verification result of Property 2 decrementing quickly from an initial value of 0.8487 to a
steady-state value of 0.0420. The same applies to Property 3 which converges to 0.9622
and to Property 4 which converges to 0.0977.
3.7.2 Real Time Streaming Protocol
RTSP is a client-server application for the delivery of data with real-time features. To de-
liver the continuous RTSP streams, it relies on the control of multiple data delivery sessions
and provides means for choosing delivery mechanisms based upon RTP or Secure RTP
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Figure 3.8: The Verification of PCTL Properties on the Shopping Online System.
(SRTP)4. SRTP provides confidentiality of RTP data, message integrity and supports source
origin authentication. From RTSP and SRTP RFC’s, we have extracted and designed the
behavior of RTSP upon Secure RTP client-server application as SysML activity diagrams.
Figure 3.9 shows the SysML activity diagram of RTSP client and Figure 3.10 presents the
SysML activity diagram of the server specific to RTSP application. The main methods used
to define RTSP vocabulary are:




• SETUP: causes the server to allocate resources for a stream and start an RTSP session.
• PLAY and RECORD: starts data transmission on a stream allocated via SETUP.
• PAUSE: temporarily halts a stream without freeing server resources.
• TEARDOWN: frees resources associated with the stream. The RTSP session ceases
to exist on the server.



























Figure 3.9: The Client SysML Activity Diagram for RTSP Protocol.
Here, we propose a set of PCTL properties to be verified against the composed model.
1. Compute the maximum probability to disconnect a client immediately by a TEAR-
DOWN attack.
Pmax=?[(¬Client!SendTeardown U≤step (Client.End))].

































Figure 3.10: The Server SysML Activity Diagram for RTSP Protocol.
of a client.
Pmax=? [true U≤step (Attack?Describe)].
3. Evaluate the maximum probability to successfully hijack a session.
Pmax=? [Client?RTP & Attack?RTP].
4. Find the minimum probability that a client fails to connect.
Pmin=?[Client.start ⇒ (X(Client.start))].
By interpreting the results showed in Figure 3.11, we conclude that the RTSP applica-
tion is free of deadlocks and the service of the client can be interrupted with a maximum
probability of 0.82 after a TEARDOWN attack. Furthermore, the attacker’s probability to
intercepting a message is at least 0.63. Finally, an attacker can hijack the client session by
a probability greater than 0.378 and a client can fail to be connected by a probability of
58
0.099.












































































Figure 3.11: The Verification of PCTL Properties on the RTSP Diagrams.
3.8 Related Work
In this section, we cite the state-of-the-art related to the formalization and the verification
of UML/SysML interaction, state machine and activity diagrams, respectively.
3.8.1 Verification of UML Interaction Diagrams
Amstel et al. [85] propose an approach to analyze the quality of UML sequence diagram.
It contains four steps: 1) analyzing the interaction traces and identify ambiguities by using
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SPIN model checker, 2) identifying patterns of common interactive behavior, 3) identifying
syntactic defects, 4) metric-based technique to describe properties such as coverage is used.
The translation in the first step is based on state machine. The pattern identification is to
locate message exchange and recurring message sequences. The static analysis is used in
the third step to detect a sequence diagram syntactic defects such as unnamed message, and
the last step is the stochastic version of basic and coverage analysis.
Lima et al. [51] verify UML 2.0 sequence diagrams by mapping each fragment into a
PROMELA process where the send/receive event specified the communication between
processes. The security properties are specified using LTL temporal logic so that they can
be verified using SPIN model checker. The counterexample is mapped to a trace in the
model to be analyzed later by the user.
3.8.2 Verification of UML State Machine Diagrams
The Static Verification Framework (SVF) developed by Siveroni et al. [81] translates the
UML state machine into PROMELA models based on automata concept. The communi-
cation assigns two channels to an object one for receiving and the other for sending. To
specify a property, they proposed a high level grammar to express properties in a user-
friendly form and translate them later to LTL.
Beato et al. [8] present a tool for the Active Behavior of UML (TABU) to verify UML ac-
tive diagrams by using SMV model checker. Three kinds of diagram are taken into account:
class, state and activity diagrams. The first provides information concerning the elements
that make up the system and their relationships, while the second and third provide infor-
mation about the timing behavior of each of those elements. The properties are specified by
the assistance of two pattern schemes: occurrence and order. Occurrence patterns describe
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properties with respect to the occurrence of a state or signal during the evolution of a sys-
tem. Order patterns establish properties with respect to the order in which they occur.
Kaliappan et al. [46] design and verify communication protocols by using model driven ar-
chitecture and SPIN Model checker. The state machine is converted into PROMELA code
as a protocol model and its properties are derived from the sequence diagram as Linear
Temporal Logic (LTL) by using the Protocol Predictor (PP). The mapping rules are written
in the standard OMG Query View Transformation (QVT) model.
3.8.3 Verification of UML/SysML Activity Diagrams
R. Eshuis [22] translates an activity diagram to NuSMV code. The translation is based on
state machine and follows four steps: 1) Inserting a WAIT node for each edge entering a
join, 2) Inserting a WAIT node between a join and a fork, 3) Replacing object nodes and
flows by wait nodes and control flows, 4) Eliminating pseudonodes and define hyperedges.
PLTL temporal logic is used for property specification.
Das et .al [17] present a timing verification of activity diagrams. The timing queries are
described in a sub-set of Timed Propositional Temporal Logic (TPTL). The constructed
semantic model is a reduced timed reachability graph which is Kripke structure-based. It
represents a set of locations and time events for each token in the system at any time. To
verify a TPTL property, two steps are: 1) Creating the tableaux of the complement of the
underlying LTL formula of the given TPTL formula, 2) Deriving a Bu¨chi automata from
the presented semantic model. Finally, applying a double DFS algorithm for checking the
product of both automaton for a reachable accepting cycle. Rafe et .al [75] determine the
correctness behavior and formal semantics of UML2.0 activity diagrams by Graph Trans-
formation Systems (GTS).
Paolo et .al [6] specify and verify an airport case study described by a class diagram and
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its behavioral activity diagram. The class diagram is interpreted as a graph, and the activity
as graph transformations. μL 2 temporal logic is introduced which allows for formulating
relevant properties of a GTS. The satisfaction of a property is defined inductively.
Federico et .al [7] map a UML4SOA activity diagram to COW. UML4SOA is an UML
profile that has been designed for modeling SOA. COW is a process calculus for specifying
service-oriented systems. An encoding function on the form of a predicate is defined to
transform each UML4SOA construct to COW term. The authors don’t show how they deal
with merge element to define recursivity.
The approach proposed by Raida et .al [20] transforms a UML activity diagram to CSP
expressions by using a graph transformation tool called ATOM. A meta-model for UML
activity diagrams is proposed for UML activity diagram and a graph grammar that per-
forms the transformation.
Ermeson et .al [13] propose a solution for verification of embedded realtime systems with
energy constraints. Real-time systems are modeled using SysML State Machine diagram,
and MARTE UML Profile (Modeling and Analysis of Real-Time and Embedded systems)
to specify ERTS’s (Embedded Real-time Systems) constraints such as execution time and
energy. They map only the states and the transitions into ETPN (Time Petri Net with En-
ergy constraints). In their transformation, they don’t give the transformation of actions in a
given state even the semantic transformation of the mutual exclusive, and orthogonal states
by taking just the states inside into consideration.
The same authors of [13] propose in [3] a similar methodology for mapping SysML ac-
tivity diagram to time Petri Net for requirement validation of embedded real-time systems
with energy constraints. The computation model formalized as an extended Time Petri Net
(TPN) is not well written. It misses the representation of the energy consumption values.
The authors don’t provide a formal transformation for the UML elements even the values
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represented from MARTE profile. Also, they don’t clarify why they present each constraint
in an action by a separate transition.
Yosr et .al [44] use PRISM Model checker to verify a SysML Activity Diagram where the
execution time of actions are formalized as constraints and the outputs of a decision node
are attributed by a specific probabilities. Their approach is to map the source model to a
Discrete-Time Markov Chains (DTMC) in order to use PRISM model checker for the as-
sessment and evaluation of performance characteristics.
Yosr et .al [43] propose an algebraic calculus called Activity Calculus (AC) for SysML ac-
tivity diagram. The semantic of the given calculus is constructed from five sets of axioms
and derivation rules (construction rules) that are used to describe the behavior evolution of
the studied diagram.
David et .al [41] introduced an extension of UML statecharts with randomly varying dura-
tion. It allows state transition to select probability. The Input/Output (I/O) automata concept
is used to provide a compositional semantics. Also, probability distribution after a continu-
ous or discrete time is introduced as an arbitrary operator. David et .al [40] introduce means
to specify system randomness within statecharts, and to verify probabilistic temporal prop-
erties. The model is represented as MDP, and the properties ares expressed in PCTL. In [2]
a framework has been proposed for verifying UML behavioral diagrams (State machine,
Activity and Sequence diagrams). Each diagram is mapped into its proper semantic model
that takes the form of of labeled transition system called Configuration Transition System
(CTS). The resulting CTS is translated into NuSMV input language.
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3.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a formal verification framework to improve the requirement
checking of SysML activity diagrams. To verify these diagrams, we have devised an ap-
proach that maps a set of SysML activity diagrams composed by call behavior and com-
munication actions into the input language of the probabilistic model checker PRISM. We
proposed a calculus dedicated to these diagrams to capture precisely their underlying se-
mantics. In addition, we formalized PRISM language. To this end, we proved the soundness
of our proposed approach by defining adequately the relationship between the semantics of
the mapped diagrams and the resulting models. In addition, we proved the preservation of
the satisfaction of PCTL properties by this relation. Finally, we demonstrated the effec-
tiveness of our approach by applying it on a real studies representing an online shopping
system and the real time streaming protocol. The proposed framework could form the basis
of any future work targeting any other operation rather than the mapping for SysML dia-
grams. In the next chapter, we propose a property-based abstraction methodology to reduce
the verification complexity of SysML activity diagrams.
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Chapter 4
Abstraction of SysML Activity Diagrams
4.1 Introduction
It is of a major importance to reduce the size complexity of SysML activity diagrams while
any approach translating the concrete diagrams into the input language of the model checker
would be limited by the tool’s abstraction mechanism, if exists. Moreover, abstracting
the semantic model instead of the concrete diagram can be costly, while the size of the
semantic model is greater than that of the diagram itself (Appendix B.1). In this chapter,
we are interested in the efficient verification of SysML activity diagrams by proposing an
abstraction framework.
Our proposed framework is based on abstracting the irrelevant action nodes and
guards with respect to a specific requirement, then, collapsing nodes that share similar
behaviors. Figure 4.1 presents an overview of the proposed abstraction framework. It takes
SysML activity diagrams and PCTL [5, 27] expressions as input. To perform verification,
we devise using the verification framework developed in Chapter 3. We prove the sound-
ness of our abstraction approach by comparing the satisfaction relation of PCTL properties
on both the abstract and the concrete diagrams. To do so, we define the adequate relation
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between the semantics models related of both diagrams (concrete and abstract). Then, we






















Figure 4.1: A Probabilistic Abstraction Framework.
By applying our approach on the example of ATM system introduced in Chapter 3,
we get a new model “Figure 4.2”. From the obtained results, we find that our approach
preserves the requirement probability value (0.84). As expected, our approach consumes











Figure 4.2: Abstract ATM SysML Activity Diagrams.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The proposed abstraction ap-
proach is detailed in Section 4.2 then its soundness is proved in Section 4.3. Section 4.5
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surveys the related work. Section 4.4 describes the experimental results. Finally, Section
4.6 concludes this chapter.
4.2 Abstraction Approach
This section describes our abstraction approach for SysML activity diagrams. First, we
present our abstraction algorithm. Then, we cover the special case of calling behaviors.
Finally, we calculate the complexity of our abstraction algorithm.
4.2.1 The Abstraction Algorithm
The abstraction of a SysML activity diagram A is based on both structures of A and the
PCTL property φ to be verified. The abstraction algorithm δ illustrated in Algorithm3
takes A and φ as input and returns a reduced SysML activity diagram denoted by Â . The
diagram A is visited using a depth-first search procedure that can be described as follows.
First, the initial node is pushed into the stack of nodes denoted by nodes (line 5). While
the stack is not empty (line 6-18), the algorithm pops a node from the stack into the current
node denoted by cNode (line 7). The current node is added into the list vNode of visited
nodes (line 9) if it is not already visited (line 8). Â is constructed by calling both functions
ϒ and Ψ. The function ϒ has the current node along with φ as arguments (line 10). It
forbids A behaviors and represents symbolically decision guards. The function Ψ has two
arguments that are the current node and its successors (line 13). It merges the current node
and its successors that share specific properties. The successor nodes are pushed into the
stack nodes (line 14) to be explored later. The algorithm ends when all nodes are visited.
The function ϒ uses the atomic propositions of the PCTL property φ . These are
principally formed from actions and guards labels while the other nodes are used to control
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Algorithm 3 The abstraction algorithm δ of SysML Activity Diagrams
Input: SysML activity diagram A , a PCTL property φ .
Output: SysML activity diagram Â .
1: nodes as Stack;  A stack of nodes which is initially empty.
2: cNode as Node;  The current node which is initially empty.
3: nNode, vNode as list_of_ Node;  List of nodes that are initially empty.
4: procedure δ (A ,φ )
5: nodes.push(in);  Read the initial node.
6: while not nodes.empty() do
7: cNode := nodes.pop();  Pop the current node.
8: if cNode not in vNode then
9: vNode.add(cNode);  Consider the current node as a visited node.
10: ϒ(cNode,φ );  Call the function ϒ.
11: nNode := cNode.successors();  Get the successors of the current node.
12: for all n in nNode do  Stores all newly discovered nodes in the stack.
13: Ψ(cNode,n);  Call the function Ψ.
14: nodes.push(n);  Stores all newly discovered nodes in the stack.
15: end for




the execution of these actions. Let Σφ be a set of independent atomic propositions such that
Σφ ⊆ {ai : i≤ n}∪{gi : i≤ m} where ai is a label corresponding to an action, gi is a guard
label, n and m are the number of actions and guards in A , respectively. The function ϒ
hides the action nodes and guards of the SysML activity diagram that are not part of the
atomic propositions of the PCTL property to be verified. It takes as input a NuAC term N
along with Σφ and generates an abstract term N̂ such that ϒ(N ,Σφ ) = N̂ . The function
ϒ implements the six inference rules stipulated in Figure 4.3 that are explained as follows.
ABS-1 rule preserves an action label when it appears in φ propositions set.
ABS-2 rule hides an action label when it does not appear in φ propositions set. The pro-
duced result is that its predecessor will be connected directly with its successor after
applying the rule ABS-5.
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ABS-1 aN a ∈ Σφ
aN
















D(g1,N1,g2,N2,g3,N3) gi:i>1 ∈ Σφ
D(g1,N1,¬g1,N2,¬g1,N3)
Figure 4.3: Inference Rules for ϒ Function.
ABS-3 rule preserves the guard label in an edge when it belongs to the set of φ proposi-
tions.
ABS-4 rule empties a guarded edge when its guard g is not a part of φ propositions.
ABS-6 rule modifies decision guarded edges by replacing guards of the unconcerned edges
by the negation of the other guards. ABS-6 can be applied on the extended versions
of decision nodes riches in probabilities and/or behavior calls.
The second function Ψ minimizes the diagram by collapsing specific control nodes while
preserving the number of tokens and their control paths too. This is achieved by prevent-
ing the modification of guarded and probabilistic choices and the modification in multi-
input/output nodes. The function Ψ implements twelve derivation rules (MIN-1,12). The
rules MIN-1,...,MIN-6 are based on the commutativity described in Property 3.2. These
rules aim at merging consecutive control nodes of the same type. The rules MIN-7,...,MIN-
10 merge parallel paths that have similar destination. The rules MIN-11 and MIN-12 elim-
inate useless nodes resulting from the application of the described ABS and MIN rules.
Hence, the minimization rules are explained as follows.
MIN-1 rule consolidates two consecutive fork nodes to produce an equivalent one.
l : F(N1,N2) N1 = l1 : F(N11,N12)
l : F(N1,N12,N22)
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MIN-2 rule merges two consecutive join nodes in only one join node.
l : J(x1,x2)N N = l′ : J(x3,x4)N ′
l : J(x1,x2,x3,x4)N ′
MIN-3 rule incorporates two successive merge nodes in one.
l :M(x1,x2)N N = l′ :M(x3,x4)N ′
l :M(x1,x2,x3,x4)N ′
MIN-4 rule collapses two successive probabilistic decision nodes to form one equivalent
probabilistic decision node.
l : D(A , p,g,N1,N2) N1 = l1 : D(A1, p1,g1,N11,N12)
l : D(F(A ,A1), p× p1,g∧g1,N11, p× (1− p1),g∧¬g1,N12,1− p,¬g,N2)
MIN-5 rule constructs a deterministic decision node starting from two consecutive deter-
ministic decision nodes.
l : D(A ,g,N1,N2) N1 = l1 : D(A1,g1,N11,N12)
l : D(F(A ,A1),g∧g1,N11,g∧¬g1,N12,¬g,N1)
MIN-6 rule merges a guarded decision node followed by another probabilistic decision
node. The result is a probabilistic decision node.
l : D(A ,g,N1,N2) N1 = l1 : D(A1, p1,g1,N11,N12)
l : D(F(A ,A1), p1,g∧g1,N11,1− p1,g∧¬g1,N12,¬g,N2)
MIN-7 rule minimizes outputs of a decision node that have the same join successor to only
one output. This also results in the minimization of input pins of the join node.
l : D(A , p1,g1,N1, p1,¬g1N2, p3,¬g1,N3) Ni = l′ : J(xi)N ′ i= 2,3
l : D(A , p1,g1,N1,N2) x= x\{x3}.
MIN-8 rule replaces a decision node outputs that have the same merge successor with only
one output.
l : D(A , p,g,N ,N1,N2) Ni = l′ :M(xi)N ′ i= 1,2.
l : D(A , p,g,N ,N1) x= x\{x2}.
MIN-9 rule reduces outputs of a fork node followed by a join.
l : F(N ,N1,N2) Ni = l′ : J(xi)N ′ i= 1,2.
l : F(N ,N1) x= x\{x2}.
MIN-10 rule reduces outputs of a fork node followed by a merge node.
l : F(N ,N1,N2) Ni = l′ :M(xi)N ′ i= 1,2.
l : F(N ,N1) x= x\{x2}.
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MIN-11 rule eliminates a merge node when it has only one input.
l :M(x)N |x|= 1.
ε −→N
MIN-12 rule eliminates a join node when it has only one input.
l : J(x)N |x|= 1.
ε −→N
4.2.2 The Call Behavior Case
In order to ensure the scalability of the verification process of a SysML activity diagram
A composed of k call behaviors Ai:1≤i≤k, we have proved Proposition 4.1, and Proposition
4.2. First, Property 4.1 stipulates the associativity property of the call behavior operator “↑”
that is needed in our proofs.
Property 4.1. The call behavior operator ↑ is associative:
(A1 ↑a1 A2) ↑a2 A3 ≡A1 ↑a1 (A2 ↑a2 A3)
Proof. The proof is based on the call behavior definition by following five steps are: 1)
constructingM1 =A1 ↑a1 A2, 2) constructingM =M1 ↑a2 A3, 3) constructing N1 =A2 ↑a2
A3, 4) constructing N =A1 ↑a1 N1, 5) comparingM and N.
Based on Property 4.1, we have proved Proposition 4.1 to handle the verification of
the diagram A of k associated behaviors with respect to a PCTL property φ . It takes into
consideration a set of call behaviors of size less than k. The call behavior composition is
built upon the fact that the property φ holds on the constructed diagram.
Proposition 4.1. Let A = A0 ↑a1 . . . ↑ak Ak be a SysML activity diagram with k call be-
haviors and φ be a PCTL property, we have:
∀i≤ k : A0 ↑a1 . . . ↑ai Ai |= φ ⇒ A |= φ .
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Proof. The proof of Proposition 4.1 is in Appendix B.2.
To further improve Proposition 4.1, we define the identity element associated to the
operator ↑ and denote it by Aid such that:
A ↑a Aid ≡A and Aid = ε .
By using the identity element, we focus more on behaviors influenced by the property
φ . This is achieved by replacing the unconcerned behaviors in Proposition 4.1 by Aid . In
Proposition 4.2, we use ΣA and Σφ to denote the set of action labels of the diagram A and
the set of atomic propositions of the property φ , respectively.
Proposition 4.2. Let A = A0 ↑a1 . . . ↑ak Ak be a SysML activity diagram with k call be-
haviors, Aid is the identity element for “↑” operator and φ be a PCTL property. For a
proposition α , we have the following:
∀1 ≤ i≤ k, α /∈ (∑φ ∩∑Ai) : [Ai =Aid ∧ (A0 ↑a1 . . . ↑ak Ak) |= φ ]⇒ [A |= φ ].
Proof. The proof follows the structural induction on PCTL syntax and it is provided in
Appendix B.2.
4.2.3 The Complexity Measure
Basically, the function ϒ produces a new model that includes mainly the specified actions
and guards in the property φ where other actions are considered as silent action. Thus,
the resulting diagram has a reduced number of actions, which increases the occurrence of
consecutive control nodes. Consequently, applying ϒ before Ψ is more efficient in terms of
time complexity as shown by Proposition 4.3.
Proposition 4.3 (Application Order). Let “A ” be a NuAC term and “φ” be a PCTL prop-
erty, we have: Ψ(ϒ(Ψ(A ),φ))≡ Ψ(ϒ(A ,φ)).
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Proof. The proof of Proposition 4.3 is in Appendix B.3.
Now, we calculate the time complexity of the algorithm δ for a SysML activity di-
agram A of n nodes (we consider n as the maximum number of nodes supported by A ).
In Algorithm 3, the while loop can run at most n times (line 6). Recursively, functions ϒ
and Ψ recall the algorithm δ when a call behavior node exists. This mechanism of recalling
produces a hierarchical form of diagrams where each node can call a new SysML activity
diagram. We introduce the notion of hierarchy depth denoted by k, which means the level
in the hierarchy from where a node has a call behavior. The worst case is that for any level
of the hierarchy, each node can call a new behavior. The computing time complexity of δ
is of class P with a worst case running time of O(nk).
4.3 The Soundness of the Abstraction Approach
In this section, we prove the soundness of our proposed abstraction algorithm. More pre-
cisely, we prove that our algorithm preserves the satisfaction of PCTL properties.
Let A be a NuAC term and MA be its corresponding PA constructed by NuAC op-
erational semantics S presented in Section 3.3 such that S (A ) ≡MA . The abstraction
algorithm δ calls both procedures ϒ and Ψ such that δ (A ,φ) = Â , where Â denotes the
abstracted term of A with respect to the PCTL property φ . Let M
Â
be its corresponding
PA defined using NuAC operational semantics S such that S (Â ) ≡ M
Â
. Proving the
soundness of the algorithm δ is to find a pre-order relation R between MA and MÂ . This
relation represents the degree of precision of MA in MÂ . As illustrated in Figure 4.4, the
relation R is composed of two relations which are Rϒ and RΨ to specify both functions ϒ
and Ψ.










Figure 4.4: Abstraction Correctness.
ϒ stutters action nodes and guarded edges. The probabilistic version of a weak transition is
denoted by (s a=⇒ μ) where μ is the distribution over states reached from s through a se-
quence of mimicked steps. The probabilistic weak simulation relation is formally described
in Definition 4.1.
Definition 4.1 (Probabilistic Weak Simulation). A probabilistic weak simulation between
two probabilistic automataM1 andM2 is a relation R  S1× S2, such that:
1. Each initial state ofM1 is related to at least one initial state ofM2,
2. For each pair of states s1Rs2 and each transition s1
a
−→ μ1 of M1, there exist a weak
combined transition s2
a
=⇒ μ2 ofM2 such that μ1 R μ2.
Here, R is the lifting of R to a probability space. It is achieved by finding a weight
function [79] that associates each state of M1 with others in M2 by a certain probability
value. Definition 4.2 defines the weight function.
Definition 4.2 (Weight Function). A function  : S× S′ → [0,1] is a weight function for
the two distributions μ1,μ2 ∈ Dist(S) w.r.t. R  S× S′, iff:
1. (s1,s2)> 0 ⇒ (s1,s2) ∈R,
2. ∀ s1 ∈ S : Σs2∈S(s1,s2) = μ1(s1),
3. ∀ s2 ∈ S : Σs1∈S(s1,s2) = μ2(s2) then s1Rs2.
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For our proof, we stipulate herein Definition 4.3 ϒ-abstraction relation between MA
and M
Â
that is denoted byMA Rϒ MÂ where MÂ ≡M
A
ϒ .
Definition 4.3 (ϒ-Abstraction Relation). An ϒ-abstraction relation is a weak probabilistic
simulation relation between a termA and its abstracted termAϒ after applying ϒ algorithm.
In the following, we present the soundness of ϒ algorithm. Let MA be a PA repre-
senting the semantics of the NuAC term A , and M
Â
is the PA representing the semantics
of Â such that Â = ϒ(A ,φ). Proving that ϒ is sound means proving there exists a weak
probabilistic simulation betweenMA and MÂ .
Lemma 4.1 (ϒ-Soundness). The abstraction algorithm ϒ is sound, i.e. MA Rϒ MÂ .
Proof. Our abstraction is sound and the proof is provided in Appendix B.4.
Now, we show that ϒ-abstraction relation preserves PCTL properties. To achieve that,
we prove by induction on the structure of the PCTL syntax to check PCTL preservation in
both abstract and concrete models. We found that, except for the neXt operator (PCTL\X ),
such a formula (φ ) holds in the concrete model if it holds in the abstracted model as stated
in Proposition 4.4.
Proposition 4.4 (ϒ-Preservation). For two PAs MA and MÂ such that MA Rϒ MÂ . If φ
is a PCTL\X property, then we have: (MÂ |= φ)⇒ (MA |= φ).
Proof. The proof of Proposition 4.4 is provided in Appendix B.4.
Similarly to ϒ-abstraction relation, we define in Definition 4.4 Ψ-Abstraction Rela-
tion.
Definition 4.4 (Ψ-Abstraction Relation). An Ψ-abstraction relation is a weak probabilistic
simulation relation between a term A and its abstracted term Â by applying Ψ algorithm.
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In Proposition 4.2, we present the soundness of Ψ-abstraction relation.
Lemma 4.2 (Ψ-Soundness). The abstraction algorithmΨ is sound, i.e. MA RΨ MÂ .
Proof. Our abstraction is sound and the proof is provided in Appendix B.4.
In Proposition 4.5, we prove the set of PCTL operators that are preserved by Ψ-
abstraction relation.
Proposition 4.5 (Ψ-Preservation). For two PAs MA and MÂ such that MA RΨ MÂ . If φ
is a PCTL property, then we have: (M
Â
|= φ)⇒ (MA |= φ).
Proof. The proof of Proposition 4.5 is provided in Appendix B.4.
4.4 Experimental Results
In this section, we apply our abstraction approach on an online shopping system and the
real time streaming protocol detailed in Chapter 3. In the purpose of providing experimen-
tal results demonstrating the efficiency and the validity of our abstraction, we verify PCTL
properties on both: the concrete and the abstract diagrams. These diagrams are modeled on
Topcased, then abstracted via our Java implementation in order to gain from the implemen-
tation of Chapter 3.
To this end, we compare the results perspective of the verification cost (β ) and the
abstraction efficiency (η). To evaluate the verification cost, we measure the time required
for verifying a given property, denoted by Tv. To evaluate the abstraction efficiency, we
measure the time required to construct the model, denoted by Tc. The verification cost is
given by β = 1− |Tv(M̂)||Tv(M)| and the abstraction efficiency by η = 1− |Tc(M̂)||Tc(M)| . Concerning the
abstraction efficiency, we measure the number of states (#s) and transitions (#t) for both
concrete and abstract diagrams. The result of the verification is denoted by (Res).
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4.4.1 Online Shopping System.
The online shopping system [32] aims at providing services for purchasing online items.
It contains four call-behavior actions1, which are: “Browse Catalogue”, “Make Order”,
“Process Order” and “Shipment”.
In order to prove the correctness of the online shopping system, we propose to verify
four functional requirements. They are expressed in PCTL as follows where n (n ∈ [0..K])
and m represent the order and the shipment numbers, respectively.
1. For each order, what is the minimum probability value to make a delivery? We ex-
press this property in PCTL as follows, where K is the maximum allowed number to
make an order.
Pmin=?[(n≤ K)U (Delivery)].
From this expression, it is clear that only the main diagram and “Process Order”
behavior are affected.
2. After browsing the catalogue, what is the minimum probability value to ship a se-
lected item? Its corresponding PCTL expression is:
Pmin=?[((SelectItem ∧ m= n ∧ m≤ K) ⇒ F(Delivery)) ⇒ F(Shipment)].
The propositions of this property belong to the main diagram and the behaviors of:
“Browse Catalogue”, “Process Order” and “Shipment”.
3. For a given customer, what is the maximum probability value to make a new order
after confirming his bill? Hence, the PCTL property related to this statement is for-
mulated.
1Each call-behavior action is represented by its proper SysML activity diagram.
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Pmax=?[G((Con f irmBill)⇒ F(MakeOrder))].
The atomic propositions of this property belongs to the main diagram.
4. For each order, what is the maximum probability value to enter a wrong code? We
write its PCTL expression as:
Pmax=?[(n= m)⇒ F(!CardOk))].
We observe that the atomic propositions of this property belong to the “Process Or-
der” SysML activity diagram.
After applying our abstraction approach, we obtain for each property a new abstracted
SysML activity diagrams and its verification results.
For Property 1, Figure 4.5 shows its abstracted diagram and Table 4.1 presents its
different verification results in function of the number of orders “n”. Furthermore, the ver-
ification results for Property 2, Property 3 and Property 4 are 0.88889, 0.145 and 0.14726,
respectively. The obtained values show that our abstraction algorithm actually preserves
the verification results. In addition, Figure 4.6 illustrates both abstraction rates in terms of
the model size and the computation time for the verification of the above PCTL properties
on the online shopping system. The evolution of both abstraction rates are important com-
pared to the growing of the model size which means the proposed abstraction improves the
verification cost.
4.4.2 Real Time Streaming Protocol
Here, we propose a set of PCTL properties to be verified against the composed model.
1. Compute the maximum probability to disconnect a client immediately by a TEAR-
DOWN attack.














(a) Online Shopping System (b) Process Order
Figure 4.5: The Abstract SysML Activity Diagram for Property 1.
2. Measure the maximum probability of an attacker intercepting DESCRIBE message
of a client.
Pmax=? [true ⇒ F (Attack?Describe)].
3. Evaluate the maximum probability to successfully hijack a session.
Pmax=? [Client?RTP & Attack?RTP].
4. Find the minimum probability that a client fails to connect.
Pmin=?[Client.start ⇒ (F(Client.start))].
The results obtained from the verification of the above properties with and without abstrac-
tion show that Property 1 achieves a maximum probability of 0.82 and at least a probability
value of 0.63 for Property 2. Furthermore, the maximum probability of the third property
is 0.974 and the minimum probability for Property 4 is 0.099. To show the abstraction ef-
ficiency of the verification of these properties, Figure 4.7 illustrates their abstraction rates
in terms of the model size and the computation time in function of the number of the sent
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Concrete Model Abstract Model Res
n #s #t Tc Tv #s #t Tc Tv
5 4848 9682 0.404 33.31 1339 2727 0.058 5.198 0.9977
10 9308 18607 0.548 63.501 0.122 2619 5352 10.49 0.9977
15 13768 27532 0.72 94.264 3899 7977 0.147 15.914 0.9977
20 18228 36457 1.137 124.904 5179 10602 0.23 21.444 0.9977
25 22688 45382 1.156 155.256 6459 13227 0.266 25.976 0.9977
30 27148 54307 1.182 187.068 7739 15852 0.325 32.037 0.9977
35 31608 63232 1.632 217.651 9019 18477 0.457 36.725 0.9977
40 36068 72157 1.819 248.451 10299 21102 0.479 41.758 0.9977
45 40528 81082 2.11 277.156 11579 23727 0.566 47.764 0.9977
50 44988 90007 2.354 306.741 12859 26352 0.399 49.84 0.9977
Table 4.1: Verification Results for Property 1.
messages. After 50 messages streaming, the model checker could not establish the verifica-
tion without abstraction. Then, we conclude that those properties are difficult to be verified
without abstraction.
4.5 Related Work
In the literature, few works examine the abstraction of SysML activity diagrams before
verification and the majority rely on the implemented abstraction algorithms within the
model checker. To our knowledge, some probabilistic model checkers support abstraction,
for example PRISM builds the symmetry reduction and LiQuor2 includes bi-simulation
equivalences. In this section, we survey the existing initiatives that propose abstraction
techniques to deal with the verification of probabilistic systems and that ones expressed as
activity diagrams.
The probabilistic abstraction [4] is a probabilistic version of the partial order reduc-
tion technique on CTL. It extends the four reduction rules of the action-sets ample by two
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(d) Property 4.
Figure 4.6: The Abstraction Rates for SOS.
of the extended ample-sets has been proved to preserve PCTL∗\X . [19] presents a sym-
metric probabilistic specification language (SPSL) close to PRISM input language. SPSL
specifies MDP symmetric models and a symmetric PCTL formula is satisfied on isomor-
phic MDPs. For verification, SPSL specification is mapped into PRISM. [47] applies the
bisimulation minimization to preserve PCTL until operator “U” on DTMCs. They use the
partition refinement algorithm to obtain Markov chain bisimulation quotient. [76] applies
the magnifying lens abstraction algorithm on MDPs. This algorithm is of two steps, the
magnified computation is performed on regions and the sliding of the magnification in a
region is performed symbolically. [48, 49] apply the predicate abstraction on MDPs. The
proposed abstraction is based on stochastic games that provide distinct lower and upper
bounds of probabilistic requirements. The key idea is to separate non-determinism in the
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Figure 4.7: The Abstraction Rates for RTSP.
Ober et al [58, 57] propose a framework to map UML models into communicating
extended timed automata (CETA) expressed in an intermediate formal representation (IF
format). To do verification, the IF validation environment incorporating a model checker
and a simulation tool is used. The former implements a set of model reduction techniques
including static analysis, partial order reduction and model minimization. In their work, the
abstraction is performed on CETA instead of UML diagrams.
Westphal [87] proposes to exploit the symmetry of UML models on the type of object
references. It uses the Rhapsody UML verification environment where the requirements are
expressed in Live Sequence Charts. Query reduction and data-type reduction are proposed.
Query reduction reduces quantified verification tasks if the model is symmetric in the quan-
tified variable’s type whereas data-type reduction interprets the concrete operators in an
abstract domain. In contrast with our approach, the proposed abstraction therein focuses on
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symmetric UML models, which represent special cases.
Prashanth and Shet [74] propose an abstraction technique for statechart models. Their
approach consists of determining the set of relevant events with respect to the safety prop-
erty (considering only the events that may lead to a non-safe state) and then constructing
the state space accordingly.
Daoxi et al [16] propose an abstraction framework of Promela models for UML be-
havioral diagrams. The abstraction is driven by LTL properties on the Kripke model ob-
tained from the Promela code. Then, the abstract Kripke model is converted to Promela
code. The latter can be verified using SPIN3 model checker. Therein, the proposed abstrac-
tion does not show the resulting abstract UML diagram. Moreover abstracting the semantics
of Promela instead of its code needs more processing steps.
Xie and Browne [88, 89] propose a verification framework for executable UML
(xUML) models. The properties are also expressed using xUML. Their framework in-
cludes a user-driven state space reduction procedure supporting the decomposition and the
symmetry reduction. The resulting model is translated into S/R language to be verified on
COSPAN model checker.
Beek et al present in [83] a framework called (UMC) for the formal analysis of con-
current systems specified by a collection of UML state machines. The formal model of a
system is given by a doubly-labeled transition system (L2TS), and the logic used to spec-
ify its properties is the state-based and event-based logic UCTL. It is an on-the-fly based
analysis with a user-guided abstraction of the transition system. The main limitation of the
approaches in [88, 89, 83] is that they are not fully automatic.
Del Mar Gallardo et al [91] propose a verification framework for UML behavioral
diagrams. The approach is devised to abstract data and events in state chart diagrams. The
first one replaces the original access definitions of variables, so the interval of their possible
3http://spinroot.com
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values is minimized. Next, abstracting events consists of using a single event name to
represent a set of real ones. In their approach, they took already abstracted models where a
mother state encompasses a set of states that will be abstracted to just one state by ignoring
what’s inside.
R. Eshuis [22, 23] propose a translation of UML activity diagrams to NuSMV code.
The proposed data abstraction is applied on guards and events. But from our experience,
some activity diagrams can be poor in these two features because the activity diagram is an
action-based diagram.
In Table 4.2, we compare our approach to the existing ones. We observe that few
of them formalize SysML activity diagrams and prove the soundness of their proposed
abstraction approaches. Moreover, our abstraction approach is efficient as it reduces the size
of the model by a considerable rate. Furthermore, our mechanism allows to gain advantage
from algorithms built within the tool in use.









Our     
Table 4.2: Comparison with the Related Work
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a formal abstraction framework to improve the scalability
of probabilistic model-checking in general, and more especially for verifying UML and
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SysML activity diagrams. The presented framework implements two algorithms, the first
abstracts the irrelevant action nodes and guards in a diagram with respect to a PCTL. And,
the second algorithm collapses nodes that share similar behaviors. We proved the soundness
of our abstraction algorithms by defining a probabilistic weak simulation relation between
the semantics of the abstract and the concrete diagrams. In addition, the preservation of
the satisfaction of PCTL properties by this relation is proved. Finally, we demonstrated the
effectiveness of our approach by applying it the online shopping system and the real time
streaming protocol. In the next chapter, we propose a compositional verification methodol-
ogy to avoid the verification of the whole diagrams.
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Chapter 5
Compositional Verification of SysML
Activity Diagrams
5.1 Introduction
The exhaustive research algorithms in model checking are generally a resource-intensive
process that requires a large amount of memory and time processing. This is due to the
fact that the systems’ state space may grow exponentially with the number of variables
combined with the presence of concurrent behaviors such as invoking behaviors in SysML
activity diagrams. In this chapter, we overcome this limitation by proposing a compositional
verification solution.
Figure 5.1 presents an overview of our proposed compositional verification frame-
work. It takes a set of SysML activity diagrams composed by the call behavior interface
and a PCTL [5, 27] property as input. First, we rely to the abstraction framework devel-
oped in the previous chapter that collapses similar behaviors and ignores the useless ones
in diagrams with respect to a PCTL property. In addition, we propose a compositional
verification approach by interface processes to distribute a PCTL property into local ones
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and to verify them separately on the obtained reduced diagrams. Each single property is
verified locally by using the verification framework proposed in Chapter 3. Finally, we
deduce the result of the main property from the local properties results. In a nutshell, the
main contributions of the present chapter can be summarized as follows: 1) Proposing an
efficient verification approach that reduces the verification overhead of probabilistic model



















Figure 5.1: A Compositional Verification Framework.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Our compositional verification
framework is detailed in the next section and Section 5.3 presents the experimental results.
Finally, Section 5.5 concludes this chapter.
5.2 The Compositional Verification Approach
This section describes first our compositional approach to verify a PCTL property on a
SysML activity diagram. Then, it shows how an activity diagram is mapped into PRISM.
Let A be a SysML activity diagram with n call behaviors denoted by:
A =A0 ↑a0 A1 · · ·Ai−1 ↑ai−1 Ai · · ·An−1 ↑an−1 An.
First, we reduce the diagram A by applying NuAC axioms and introducing Proposition 5.1
that ignores behaviors Ai that are not influenced by the property φ to be verified.
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Proposition 5.1. LetA be a diagram that contains n behaviors, APφ is the atomic proposi-
tions of the PCTL property φ and APAi is the atomic propositions of the behavior diagram
Ai. Then, we have:
∀Ai:0≤i≤n,APφ ∩APAi:0≤i≤n = /0 :Ai = ε∧ [(A0 ↑a0 A1 · · ·An−1 ↑an−1 An) |= φ ]⇒ [A |= φ ].
Proof. The proof of this proposition follows an induction reasoning on PCTL structure.
Here, we take the case of φ = φ1Uφ2.
For ∀Ai:0≤i≤n,APφ ∩APAi:0≤i≤n = /0 : Ai = ε , we will have: A0 ↑a0 A1 · · ·Ak−1 ↑ak−1 Ak).
Let [(A0 ↑a0 A1 · · ·Ak−1 ↑ak−1 Ak) |= φ ]
⇔∃m, ∀ j < m : π( j) |= φ1 ∧π(m) |= φ2.
By calling Ai in ai using BH-1, the only changes in π are the propositions of Ai till execut-
ing BH-2, then:
∃m′ ≥ m, j′ ≥ j, ∀ j′ < m′ : π( j′) |= φ1∧π(m′) |= φ2
⇔ A0 ↑a1 . . . ↑ak Ak . . . ↑ai Ai |= φ .
By calling new Ai+1 in ai+1 up to n, we will have:
∃m′′ ≥ m′, j′′ ≥ j′, ∀ j′′ < m′′ : π( j′′) |= φ1∧π(m′′) |= φ2
⇔A0 ↑a1 . . . ↑an An |= φ ⇔A |= φ1Uφ2.
For φ1U≤kφ2 and Xφ cases, we deduce the following.
• ∀Ai:0≤i≤n,APφ ∩APAi:0≤i≤n = /0 :Ai= ε∧[(A0 ↑a0 A1 · · ·An−1 ↑an−1 An) |= φ1U≤kφ2]⇒
[∃k′ ≥ k : A |= φ1U≤k′φ2].
• ∀Ai:0≤i≤n,APφ ∩APAi:0≤i≤n = /0 : Ai = ε∧
[(A0 ↑a0 A1 · · ·An−1 ↑an−1 An) |= Xφ ]⇒ [A |= Xφ ].
To decompose the PCTL property φ into local ones φi:0≤i≤n over Ai with respect to
the call behavior actions ai:0≤i≤n (interfaces), we introduce the decomposition operator “”
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proposed in Definition 5.1. The operator “” is based on substituting the propositions of Ai
to the propositions related to its interface ai−1 which allows the compositional verification.
It uses the π-calculus substitution notation Q[z/y] which means in the structure Q, the term
z is substituted for the term y.
Definition 5.1 (PCTL Property Decomposition). Let φ be a PCTL property to be verified
on A1 ↑a A2. The decomposition of φ into φ1 and φ2 is denoted by φ = φ1aφ2 where APAi
are the atomic propositions of Ai, then:
1. φ1 = φ([la/APA2]), where la is the atomic proposition related to the action a in A1.
2. φ2 = φ([/APA1]).
The first rule is based on the fact that the only transition to reach a state in A2 from
A1 is the transition of the action la (BH-1). The second rule ignores the existence of A1
while it kept unchanged till the execution of BH-2. To handle multiplicity for the operator
“”, we prove Property 5.1.
Property 5.1. The decomposition operator “” is commutative and associative, i.e.
1. For A1 ↑a1 A2, the decomposition operator  is commutative: φ1a1φ2 ≡ φ2a1φ1.
2. ForA1 ↑a1 A2 ↑a2 A3, the decomposition operator  is associative: φ1a1(φ2a2φ3)≡
(φ1a1φ2)a2φ3.
Proof. 1. The commutativity of  is proved by constructing Φ1 = φ1φ2 and Φ2 = φ2φ1,
then comparing Φ1 and Φ2.
2. Similarly to the commutativity, the associativity of  is proved.
For the verification of φ on A1 ↑a1 A2, Theorem 5.1 deduces the satisfiability of φ
from the satisfiability of local properties φ1 and φ2 obtained by .
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Theorem 5.1 (Compositional Verification-CV). The decomposition of the PCTL property
φ by the decomposition operator  for A1 ↑a1 A2 is sound. i.e.
A1 |= φ1 A2 |= φ2 φ = φ1a1φ2
A1 ↑a1 A2 |= φ
Proof. The proof of Proposition 5.1 follows a structural induction on the PCTL structure
by using Definition 5.1.
As an example, we take the until operator “U”. Let φ = ap1 U ap2 where ap1 ∈ APA1 and
ap2 ∈ APA2.
By applying Definition 5.1, we have: φ1 = ap1 U a1 and φ2 =  U ap2. Let A1 |= φ1 ⇔
∃m1, ∀ j1 < m1 : π1( j1) |= ap1 ∧π1(m1) |= ap1∧a1.
For A2 |= φ2 ⇔∃m2, ∀ j2 < m2 : π2( j2) |=∧π2(m2) |= ap2.
To construct A1 ↑a1 A2, BH-1 is the only transition to connect π1 and π2 which form:
π = π1.π
′
2 such that π
′
2(i) = π2(i)∪π1(m1). Then: ∃ j ≤ m, m = m1 +m2 : π( j) |= ap1 ∧
π(m) |= ap2 ⇔A1 ↑a1 A2 |= φ
Finally, Proposition 5.2 generalizes Theorem 5.1 to support the satisfiability of φ on
an activity diagram with n behaviors.
Proposition 5.2 (CV-Generalization). Let φ be a PCTL property to be verified on A , such
that: A =A0 ↑a0 · · · ↑an−1 An and φ = φ0a0 · · ·an−1φn, then:
A0 |= φ0 · · ·An |= φn
φ = φ0a0 · · ·an−1φn
A0 ↑a0 · · · ↑an−1 An |= φ
Proof. We prove Proposition 5.2 by induction on n.
• The base step where “n= 1” is proved by Theorem 5.1.
• For the inductive step, first, we assume:
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A0 |= φ0 · · ·An |= φn
φ = φ0a0 · · ·an−1φn
A0 ↑a0 · · · ↑an−1 An |= φ
Let A ′ =A0 ↑a0 · · · ↑an−1 An and φ ′ = φ0a0 · · ·an−1φn. While  and ↑ are associative
operators, then: A = A ′ ↑an An+1 and φ = φ ′anφn+1. By assuming An |= φn and
applying Theorem 5.1, then:
A ′ |= φ ′ An+1 |= φn+1
A =A ′ ↑an An+1 φ = φ ′anφn+1
A |= φ
5.3 Experimental Results
In the purpose of providing experimental results demonstrating the efficiency and validity
of our framework, we verify a set of PCTL properties on the online shopping system [32]
studied in the previous chapters. To this end, we compare the results “β” and the verification
cost in terms of the model size 1 “γ” and the verification time “δ” (sec) with and without
applying our approach.
For the diagram depicted in Figure 3.7a, the call behaviors action nodes: “Browse
Catalogue”, “Make Order”, “Process Order” and “Shipment” are denoted by a, b, c and d,
respectively. For simplicity, we take this order to denote their associated diagrams by A1
to A4, respectively, where A0 denotes the main diagram. As example, Figure 3.7b expands
the call behavior action “Process Order” denoted by A3. The whole diagram is written by:
A =A0 ↑a A1 ↑b A2 ↑c A3 ↑d A4.
Here, we propose to verify the the following properties that are expressed in PCTL.
1The model size is the number of transitions (edges).
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Property Φ1. “For each order, what is the minimum probability value to make a
delivery after browsing the catalogue?”
Pmin=?[(Browse Catalogue) ⇒ (F(Delivery))].
In this expression, the “Browse Catalogue” proposition is part of A0 and “Delivery”
is a proposition of A3. For comparison, we verify first Φ on A . Then, by using Propo-
sition 5.1, we reduce the verification of Φ on A to Φ on A0 ↑c A3. By using the de-
composition rules of Definition 5.1, Φ1 is decomposed into two properties: Φ11 and Φ12
such that: Φ11  Pmin =?[(Browse Catalogue) ⇒ (F(Process Order))], and Φ12 
Pmin=?[(True) ⇒ (F(Delivery))].
After the verification of Φ1 on A , Φ11 on A0 and Φ12 on A3, Table 5.1 summa-
rizes the verification results and costs for different values of the number of orders “n”.
From the obtained results, we observe that the probability values are preserved where
β (Φ1)=β (Φ11)×β (Φ12). In addition, the size of the diagrams is minimized (γ(Φ11) +
γ(Φ12) < γ(Φ1)). Consequently, the verification time is reduced significantly: (δ (Φ11)+
δ (Φ12) δ (Φ1)).
Property Φ2. “For each order, what is the maximum probability value to confirm a
shipment?”
Pmax=?[G((CreateDelivery)⇒ F(Con f irmShipment)].
The propositions of this property “CreateDelivery” and “ConfirmShipment” belong to A2,
and A4, respectively. Similarly to the verification Φ1, we verify Φ2 on A . Then, we
decompose Φ2 to Φ21, Φ22 with respect to A0 ↑b A2 ↑d A4. The PCTL expressions of the
decomposition are as follows.
Φ21 : Pmax=?[G((CreateDelivery)⇒ F(Shipment)].














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.2 shows the verification results and costs of Φ2 on A , Φ21 A0 ↑bA2, and Φ22
on A4 for different values of the number of orders “n”. We found that β (Φ2) = β (Φ21)×
β (Φ22), γ(Φ21)+ γ(Φ22)< γ(Φ2) and δ (Φ21)+δ (Φ22) δ (Φ2).
5.4 Related Work
To compare our work to the existing ones, we survey the verification initiatives dedi-
cated mainly to SysML activity diagrams and the probabilistic compositional verification.
[18, 42] map the basic artifacts of a single SysML activity diagram into PRISM code where
both of them inherit PRISM verification limitations. [67] introduces the abstraction by state
merging to reduce the verification cost of SysML activity diagrams whereas [68] improves
the abstraction technique in [67] by proposing the abstraction by restriction on more behav-
iors. Concerning the compositional verification for probabilistic systems, [26] discusses
assume-guarantee technique for probabilistic system by focusing more on the leaning algo-
rithm to generate the minimal deterministic automata that represents a probabilistic safety
property. [25] proposes assume-guarantee where both assumption and guarantee properties
are probabilistic safety properties such that assumptions are generated manually. [24] ap-
plies the assume-guarantee technique on synchronous systems modeled as DTMC, where
assumptions are safety properties defined as probabilistic finite automata. To our knowl-
edge, few probabilistic model checkers support abstraction and compositional verification





In this chapter, we presented a compositional verification framework to improve the effi-
ciency and the scalability of probabilistic model-checking. More specifically, our target
was verifying systems modeled using SysML activity diagrams. The presented framework
is based on abstraction by ignoring and merging behaviors that are irrelevant to a given
PCTL property. Moreover, we introduced a probabilistic compositional verification ap-
proach based on decomposing a global PCTL property into local ones with respect to the
interfaces between diagrams. We proved the soundness of the proposed framework by
showing that the satisfaction relation of the PCTL properties are preserved. Furthermore,
we proposed a semantic for SysML activity diagrams that helps on proofs and to encode
easily the diagrams in PRISM. In addition, we demonstrated the effectiveness of our ap-
proach by applying it on the online shopping system. In the next chapter, we propose a




Security Specification of SysML Activity
Diagrams
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we address the issue of security specification and security risk assessment
of software/systems modeled by using SysML activity diagrams. The goal is to gauge how
well a product is meeting its security requirements. Our security specification framework
uses the verification framework introduced in the previous chapter to assess security risk. It
is composed of two stages: specification and evaluation as depicted in Figure 6.1. The for-
mer is to express easily the system requirements by introducing potential attack templates,
whereas the latter is a verification approach to evaluate their security level. First, we use
SysML activity diagrams to develop a library of CAPEC attack application-independent
templates with varied potential gains that can exploit the system vulnerabilities. By using
this library, application-dependent attack scenarios are instantiated and the interaction be-
tween the attack and the system diagrams is defined. In order to subject this interaction
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to the verification framework (Chapter 3), the interaction is defined and the security re-
quirements are represented by SysML activity diagrams. Then, a specification algorithm
is proposed to generate their equivalent PCTL expressions. Finally, the verification frame-
work produces the probability value that represents the satisfaction degree of the generated



































Figure 6.1: Security Risk Assessment Framework.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2.3 presents the
attack patterns. Our framework that contains the security specification and evaluation is
detailed in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 describes the experimental results and Section 6.5
surveys the existing related work. Finally, Section 6.6 concludes this chapter.
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6.2 Software Security
In this chapter, we introduce the concept of security requirements and security attack mod-
els. The, we model a standard catalogue of attacks.
6.2.1 Security Properties
A software should satisfy its related security requirements to avoid the exploitation of vul-
nerabilities by attacks and threats. These requirements are also called security properties
and some of them are used by measure community to evaluate security. Here, we cite the
main known security properties:
• Authentication. It identifies an entity before granting access to a system’s resource.
• Confidentiality. It is the concealment of information or resources. The data is dis-
closed only as intended by the enterprize.
• Integrity. The integrity of a variable is preserved if it doesn’t take any value different
from the ones it should have at any time during the execution of a system.
• Availability. It is the property that enterprize assets, including business processes,
will be accessible when needed for authorized use.
• Secrecy. A system preserves the secrecy of an information, if, it does not appear for
an adversary.
• Authenticity. The message authenticity is to secure the information on the message
origin.
• Freshness. A message is fresh, only if, it is unpredictable and it has never appeared
during the system execution.
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6.2.2 Attack Scenario
Here, we present the attack behavior and show its impact on a system. As defined in [1], an
attack is an attempt to gain unauthorized access to an Information System’s (IS) services,
resources, or information or the attempt to compromise an IS’s integrity, availability, or
confidentiality, as applicable. Different attack models have been deployed such as: attack
tree, attack graph, and network attack graph.
• An attack tree [52] is a tree where the nodes represent attacks. The root node of the
tree is the global goal of the attack. Children of a node are refinements of this goal,
and leafs therefore represent attacks that can no longer be refined. A refinement can
be done by either an aggregation or a choice.
• An attack graph [78] is a graph where each vertex represents the entire network state
and the arcs represent state transitions caused by an attacker’s actions. Also, a vertex
can not represent the entire state of a system but rather a system condition in a predi-
cate form and the arcs represent the relations between the system conditions. In this
case, the attack graph is called a dependency attack graph.
• A network attack [80] is an attack model [80] composed of the computer network, the
attacker, and the defender. A state transition in a network attack model corresponds
to a single action by the intruder, a defensive action by the system administrator, or a
routine network action.
6.2.3 Standard Attack Patterns
This section presents the concept of attack patterns, introduces the notion of probabilistic
likelihood of an attack and formalizes attack patterns as SysML activity diagrams.
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Software security attack patterns are currently being researched and designed to ex-
pose exploited code development flaws and describe the common methods, techniques, and
logic that attackers use to exploit software [31]. Many researches and organizations such
as CAPEC and WASC1 show special interest in attack patterns. They are expressed in a
textual format and described using a set of predefined elements including the attack goal,
the preconditions, the attack steps and the post-conditions of a successful attack.
Particularly, CAPEC is a software assurance strategic initiative that provides a pub-
licly available catalog of attack patterns. It counts 311 attack patterns (each identified using
a unique identifier) organized into 67 categories and sub-categories. The CAPEC attack pat-
terns are documented according to a standard schema devised by CAPEC that includes both
primary and supporting schema elements. Primary schema elements include the pattern id,
the description of the attack, related weaknesses, typical severity, likelihood of exploitation,
attack surface, and abstraction level. The supporting schema elements are categorized into
describing, diagnosing, and enhancing information. Our first objective is to model attack
patterns using SysML activity diagrams. To this end, we propose the template of attack
patterns described as a SysML activity diagram shown in Figure 6.2.
Each concrete attack pattern is built by instantiating this template and specifying the
call behavior action denoted by “Pattern Behavior”. The main control flow in this template
is a probabilistic decision used to specify the likelihood of the attack occurrence, which
corresponds to the probability “P”. The value of “P” is determined based on the “typical
likelihood of exploitation” schema element provided within CAPEC catalogue. However,
this schema element is a qualitative description of the likelihood that ranges from “low”
to “high”. In order to quantify this attribute, we propose to assign ranges of probabilities
to each qualitative description based on the standard of security risk management [39] in
1http://www.webappsec.org, The Web Application Security Consortium.
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combination with the Kent‘s Words of Estimative Probability2. The probability ranges
corresponding to the estimative terms are specified in Table 6.1. The probability related to
the instantiated attack pattern is obtained by a centroid defuzzification function3.
Figure 6.2: SysML Activity Diagram of the Attack Pattern Template.
Table 6.1: Probability Values Scale.
CAPEC terms Kent’s Estimative terms Probability values
High Certain 100
High Almost Certain 93% (±6%)
Medium to High Probable 75% (±12%)
Medium Chances About Even 50%(±10%)
Low to Medium Probably Not 30%(±10%)
Low Almost Certainly Not 7%(±5%)
Low Impossible 0
Since not all attacks in CAPEC can be applied at the design level, we need to select
attack patterns that are technology and platform independent. Thus, we rely on the “pattern
abstraction level” schema element to select the applicable attack patterns. The latter schema
element defines three levels of abstraction: meta, standard, and detailed. Particularly, we
focus on the standard level, which corresponds to a typically functional context-dependent
but technology context-independent attack pattern. In the following, we provide the set of
the considered CAPEC attack patterns with their corresponding activity flows representing
the pattern behavior and their associated likelihoods.
2https://www.cia.gov/library; Words of Estimative Probability.
3http://www.osti.gov; Office of Scientific and Technical Information.
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• Spoofing (CAPEC-156): An attacker builds a message such that it is able of mas-
querading an authorized message from a trusted principal. As a result, consumers
of these messages can be manipulated into responding or processing the deceptive
message. It may refer to spoofing the content (CAPEC-148) or the id (CAPEC-151).
Their pattern is depicted by the followingfigure such that P(CAPEC-148)=P(CAPEC-
151)=0.8.
6SRRILQJ 5H6HQG&DSWXUH
• Data Leakage (CAPEC-118): In this class, the attacker uses well-formed requests
to get sensitive information by exploiting weaknesses in the design. The attacker
may collect this information through a variety of methods including active querying
as well as passive observation. Three techniques are used in this class: Data exca-
vation (CAPEC-116), Data interception (CAPEC-117), and Sniffing (CAPEC-148).
CAPEC-116 and CAPEC-117 are presented by the first control flow with P(CAPEC-
116)=0.5 and =P(CAPEC-117)=0.5. Also, CAPEC-148 is illustrated in the second
control flow with a probability value P(CAPEC-148)=0.2.
5HTXHVW 5HVSRQVH
6QLIILQJ
• Resource Depletion (CAPEC-119): The attacker depletes a resource to the point that
the target’s functionality is affected. The result is usually the degradation or denial of
one or more services offered by the target. In order to deplete the target’s resources,
the attacker can achieve its objective through flooding (CAPEC-125), through leak
(CAPEC-131) by uploading a malicious file, or through allocation (CAPEC-131) by
sending a formatted request. The pattern of these attacks is depicted by the fol-
lowing figure and launched by these probability values: P(CAPEC-125|n≥ m)= 0.8,
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• Injection (CAPEC-152): The attacker is able to control or disrupt the behavior of
a target through crafted input data submitted using an interface functioning to pro-
cess data input. Different resource-dependent patterns are detailed in CAPEC and
abstracted to design level such as SQL (CAPEC-66), email (CAPEC-134), format
string (CAPEC-135), LDAP (CAPEC-136), resource injection (CAPEC-240), script
injection (CAPEC-242), and command injection (CAPEC-248). All of them take the
form of the following control flow with a probability value equal to 0.8.
3UHSDUH ,QMHFW
• Exploitation of Authentication (CAPEC-225) takes advantage of weaknesses related
to authentication mechanisms including authentication bypass by spoofing (CWE-ID-
290), authentication bypass by assumed immutable data (CWE-ID-302), and origin
validation error (CWE-ID-346). Particularly, its descendent sub-category CAPEC-
21 aims at exploiting session variables, resource IDs and other trusted credentials to
take advantage of the fact that some software accepts user input without verifying its
authenticity. They have the following work flow with P = 0.8.
*XHVV,' 5HTXHVW 5HVSRQVH
• Fuzzing (CAPEC-28): It is part of the probabilistic techniques (CAPEC-223) and
it is inspired by a software testing method. The attacker provides randomly gener-
ated input to the system and looks for an indication to identify weaknesses in the
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system. The pattern of this attack is depicted by the following control flow such







6.3 Security Properties Specification
In this section, we detail the specification and the evaluation procedures of the proposed
framework presented in Section 6.1.
6.3.1 The Security Requirements Specification
This section describes the specification of SysML activity diagrams A as PCTL temporal
logic expressions. Algorithm 4 illustrates the specification procedure Ξ that takes A as
input and produces its equivalent PCTL expression denoted by PCTLexp. The procedure Ξ
parses the diagram A with a complexity of O(|n|2) by using a depth-first search where |n|
is the number of activity nodes in A .
The procedure Ξ is described as follows. First, the initial node is pushed into the
stack of nodes denoted by nodes (line 9). While the stack is not empty (line 10-27), the
algorithm pops a node from the stack nodes into the current node denoted by cNode (line
12). Then, the current node is added into the list vNode of visited nodes (line 15) if it is
not already visited (line 13). The PCTL expressions denoted by PCTLexp is constructed by
calling the function Λ (line 19) that has two arguments which are the current node cNode
and its successors saved in the list nNode (line 17). The explored successors are pushed into
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the stack nodes (line 22-24), then, they are cleared from the list nNode (line 26). Finally,
the algorithm terminates when all nodes are visited.
Algorithm 4 Specification Algorithm Ξ of SysML Activity Diagrams into PCTL Expres-
sion.
Input: SysML activity diagrams A .
Output: PCTL expression PCTLexp.
1: nodes as Stack;  A stack of nodes which is initially empty.
2: cNode as Node;  The current node which is initially empty.
3: nNode, vNode as list_of_Node;  List of nodes that are initially empty.
4: procedure Ξ(A )
5: nodes.push(in);  Push the initial node in the stack nodes.
6: while not nodes.empty() do  Pop the current node.
7: cNode := nodes.pop();
8: if cNode not in vNode then  Consider the current node as a visited node.
9: vNode.add(cNode);  Get the successors of the current node.
10: nNode := cNode.successors();
 Call the mapping rules function.
11: PCTLexp.add(Λ(cNode,nNode));
12: end if  Stores all newly discovered nodes.
13: for all n in nNode do
14: nodes.push(n);




The function Λ presented in Listing 6.1 produces the appropriate PCTL expression
for the current node. It takes into consideration the current node and its successors, both of
them constitute the atomic propositions of the resulted PCTL property. The selected PCTL
operators (X, U≤k or U) to express the produced property depends on the structure of the
current node and the semantic operational rules developed by NuAC. The rule 1 (line 3)
expresses the existence of an element “N ” during the execution of a SysML activity di-
agram, whereas the rule 2 (line 7) shows the execution of successive elements “N1” and
“N2” that both of them have one output and one input, respectively. The rule 4 (line 18)
specifies the properties of a guarded decision node and the rule 3 (line 12) is a probabilistic
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version of the previous rule (rule 4). The rule 5 in line 25 denotes properties proper to a
merge node and the rule 6 in line 31 specifies properties related to a fork node. The rule 7
in line 38 describes the properties related to a join node. Finally, the rule 8 in line 46 mea-
sures the minimum/maximum probability of the satisfaction of a generated PCTL property.
The min/max probability values are considered with respect to the non-determinism in the
system/attack interaction. Each rule is referenced by its order, for example “l⇒F(L(N2))”
(line 9) is denoted by Rule 2-b and L(N2) returns a label of the term N2.
Listing 6.1: PCTL Specification Function.
1 Λ :A → φ
2 Λ (A ) = ∀n ∈A , Case (n ) o f
3 l : N ⇒
4 in
5 {X(l)} ∪ {F(l)} ∪ {U≤k l}
6 end
7 l : N1N2 ⇒
8 in
9 {l⇒X(L(N2))} ∪ {l⇒F(L(N2))} ∪ {l U L(N2)}
10 ∪ {l U≤k L(N2)}∪ Λ(N1) ∪ Λ(N2)
11 end
12 l : D(p,g,N1,N2) ⇒
13 Case ( p ) o f
14 ]0,1[ ⇒
15 in
16 {P(Λ(l : D(g,N1,N2)))  pi}
17 end
18 O t h e r w i s e ⇒
19 in
20 {l⇒X(L(N1)∨L(N2))} ∪ {l⇒F(L(N1))}
21 ∪ {l⇒F(L(N2))} ∪ {g⇒X(L(N1))}
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22 ∪ {g⇒F(L(N1))} ∪ {¬g⇒X(L(N2))}
23 ∪ {¬g⇒F(L(N2))} ∪ Λ(N1) ∪ Λ(N2)
24 end
25 l :M(x,y)N ⇒
26 in
27 {lx⇒X(L(N ))} ∪ {lx⇒F(L(N ))}∪ {lx U L(N )}
28 ∪ {lxU≤k L(N )}∪{ly⇒X(L(N ))}∪ {lyU≤kL(N )}
29 ∪ {ly⇒F(L(N ))} ∪ {ly U L(N )} ∪ Λ(N )
30 end
31 l : F(N1,N2) ⇒
32 in
33 {l⇒X(L(N1)∧L(N2))} ∪ {l⇒X(L(N1)}
34 ∪ {l⇒X(L(N2)} ∪ {l⇒F(L(N1)∧L(N2))}
35 ∪ {l⇒F(L(N1))} ∪ {l⇒F(L(N2))}
36 ∪ Λ(N1) ∪ Λ(N2)
37 end
38 l : J(x,y)N ⇒
39 in
40 {lx⇒X(L(N ))} ∪ {lx⇒F(L(N ))}
41 ∪ {lx U L(N )} ∪ {lx U≤k L(N )}∪ {ly⇒X(L(N ))}
42 ∪ {ly⇒F(L(N ))} ∪ {ly U L(N )} ∪ {ly U≤k L(N )}
43 ∪ {lx∧ ly⇒X(L(N ))} ∪ {lx∧ ly⇒F(L(N ))}
44 ∪ {ly⇒ U L(N )}∪Λ(N )
45 end
46 O t h e r w i s e
47 in
48 {Pmin=?[G(Λ(N ))]} ∪ {Pmin=?[F(Λ(N ))]}
49 ∪ {Pmin=?[GF(Λ(N ))]}∪{Pmax=?[G(Λ(N ))]}
50 ∪ {Pmax=?[F(Λ(N ))]} ∪ {Pmax=?[GF(Λ(N ))]}
51 ∪ {Pmin=?[(Λ(N ))]} ∪ {Pmax=?[(Λ(N ))]}
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52 end
6.3.2 The Security Requirements Evaluation
In this section, we define the interaction operator between the system and the attack dia-
grams. For evaluation, we express this interaction in PRISM.
Basically, a system’s attack surface is the way in which an adversary can interact with
the system and potentially cause damage to it. The larger the attack surface, the greater
will be the number of potential attacks. The definition of an attack surface for an activity
diagram is given by Definition 6.1.
Definition 6.1 (NuAC Attack Surface). An attack surface of a NUAC term A is the tuple
ASA = (N, X , O, Ch), where:
• N is the set of entry points that can receive signal and object tokens,
• X is the set of exit points that produces tokens,
• O is the set of un-trusted data/tokens,
• Ch : N×X → O is a function assigning to each entry and exit point a token/object.
To define the global model, we introduce the concept of interaction interface denoted
by I between two SysML activity diagrams A1 and A2. It is based on the attack surfaces
of the interacting diagrams. Specifically, it matches exit points of one activity diagram to
the entry points of the other. The interaction interface is given in Definition 6.2.
Definition 6.2 (NuAC Interaction Interface). An interaction interface between two SysML
activity diagrams A1 with an attack surface ASA1 and A2 with an attack surface ASA2 is a
set of triplet I = {(n, x, o) ∈ NA1 ×XA2 ×O2∪NA2 ×XA1 ×O1|Ch1(n) =Ch2(x) = o}.
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In our perspective, we consider the interaction between the system and the attack
scenario. Thus, given the system diagram A1, the attack diagram A2, and their interaction
interface I , the global diagram can be written as follows A = A1 ‖I A2. We define
the composition in PRISM as a system combined by the synchronization CSP algebraic
operator as presented in Listing 6.2.
Listing 6.2: PRISM Fragment code for the Composition
1
2 / / PRISM Fragment code f o r t h e d iag ram Ai
3
4 Module Ai
5 / / V a r i a b l e i n i t i a l i z a t i o n .
6 l0 b o o l i n i t t r u e ;
7 · · ·
8 li b o o l i n i t f a l s e ;
9 · · ·
10 ln b o o l i n i t f a l s e ;
11 / / Module commands .
12 / / I n i t i a l node command .
13 [ l0 ] l0 → (l′0 = f alse)&(L(N )′ = true) ;
14 · · ·
15 / / A p r o b a b i l i s t i c node command .
16 [ li ] gi → ···+pk : uk+· · · ;
17 · · ·
18 / / A non p r o b a b i l i s t i c node command .
19 [ l j ] g j → um ;
20 · · ·
21 / / F i n a l node command .




25 / / PRISM Fragment code f o r t h e c o m p o s i t i o n A1 ‖I A2
26 sy s tem
27 A1|[L(n1)L(x1),L(n2)L(x2)]|A2
28 e n d sy s t em
6.4 Experimental Results
We apply the developed approach in this chapter on the Real Time Streaming Protocol.
First, we describe the builded attack scenario. Then, We evaluate the proposed security
properties.
6.4.1 Attack Scenario
In Figure 6.3, we present the SysML activity diagram that describes the behavior of the
attack scenario specific to RTSP application. It is composed of the attack patterns CAPEC-
(156 ,118, 119, 225). The main abilities of these attacks are: flooding the server by sending
DESCRIBE messages (CAPEC-119), hijacking users sessions by modifying SETUP mes-
sages (CAPEC-156), disturbing the service by sending PAUSE message after a successful
hijacking session (CAPEC-156), illegitimate access to media by sending PLAY message
after a successful session hijacking (CAPEC-118), sniffing the media in transit (CAPEC-
156), and interrupting the service by sending TEARDOWN message (CAPEC-119). The
generated attack model interacts with the RTSP client and server models as a third party.
The composition of the three SysML activity diagrams are automatically translated into
PRISM code by using the framework developed in Chapter 3.
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Figure 6.3: SysML activity diagram for RTSP Attack Scenario.
6.4.2 Properties Specification and Evaluation
Here, we propose four security requirements to be verified against the composition of
Server/Client/Attack diagrams. Each security requirement is described by a SysML activity
diagram then mapped into PCTL expression.
Property 1. “Compute the maximum probability to disconnect a client immediately
by a TEARDOWN attack”. This requirement is described by the following diagram.
We refer to the labels “Attack.Teardown” send message node from the attack diagram
and “Client.End” action node from the client SysML activity diagram to consider them as
two atomic propositions. In addition, this requirement asks for an immediate consequence
which means Rule 2-a will be applied. Then, the obtained property will be:
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(Attack.Teardown⇒(X (Client.End))).
Furthermore, to measure the maximum probability we rely on Rule 8-d that generates the
following PCTL property.
Pmax=?[G(Attack.Teardown⇒(X (Client.End)))].
After the verification of this property, we observe that the client can be interrupted with a
probability of 0.82 after a Teardown attack.
Property 2. “Compute the minimum probability of an attacker pausing the me-
dia viewed by a client”. This requirement is expressed in the following diagrams where
“Client.Play”, “Attack.Pause”, and “Client.Stop” are the atomic propositions.
First, we apply Rule 5-b related to the second merge node we have:
(Client.Play)⇒(F(Attack.Pause)).
Then, we apply Rule 3-b for the second decision node, we get:
((Client.Play)⇒(F(Attack.Pause)))⇒(F(Client.Stop)).
Finally, by applying Rule 8-g we get the last PCTL expression.
Pmin=? [((Client.Play)⇒(F(Attack.Pause)))⇒(F(Client.Stop))].
After verification, we found that the attacker’s probability to disturb a client from viewing
media is 0.6.
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Property 3. “Measure the minimum probability to successfully hijack a session”. This
requirement is described by the following SysML activity diagram such that “Client.Play”,
“Attack.Setup” and “Client.End” are the atomic propositions.
First, by applying Rule 5-b for the third merge node we have:
Client.Play⇒(F(Attack.Setup)).
Then, we apply Rule 2-c to have:
(Client.Play⇒(F(Attack.Setup)) U Client.End
Finally, Rule 8-g is applied to generate the final property:
Pmin=? [G((Client.Play⇒(F(Attack.Setup)) U Client.End)].
After the evaluation of this property, we conclude that the client can lose its session by a
probability value 1.
Property 4. “Find the minimum probability that an attacker enforces a client to pause
viewing”. The SysML activity diagram of this requirement is shown here.
First, we rely to Rule 5-b for the third merge node which result:
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Client.Play⇒(F(Attack.Pause)).
Then, we apply Rule 2-c to have:
Client.Play⇒(F(Attack.Pause)U Client.End).
Finally, Rule 8-a is applied to obtain the last PCTL expression:
Pmin=?[G(Client.Play⇒(F(Attack.Pause)U Client.End))].
The result obtained regarding the verification of the fourth property deduces that a client
can be stopped to view the media by a probability of 0.8.
6.5 Related Work
In this section, we cite the existing works related to security specification and attack-based
security analysis.
[29] identifies security vulnerabilities in code level by tailoring attack patterns based
on the software components. These patterns take the form of regular expressions that are
generic representations of vulnerabilities. [33] proposes a risk-based approach that cre-
ates modular attack trees for each component in the system. These trees are specified as
parametric constraints, which allow quantifying the probability of security breaches that
occur due to internal and external component vulnerabilities. [30] advocates the use of the
Aspect-Oriented Risk-Driven Development (AORDD) methodology based on formal secu-
rity evaluation and a trade-off analysis. [12] verifies security requirements by a qualitative
analysis and then computes performance measure as a quantitative entity provided by a
performance analysis of UML sequence diagram. [77] verifies the security of communica-




security of system configurations in terms of the weakest adversary that can compromise
the network. [28] models probability metrics based on attack graphs as a special Bayesian
Network. Each node of the network represents vulnerabilities as well as the pre and post
conditions.
[45, 37] extract specific cryptography-related information from UMLsec diagrams.
Moreover, the Dolev-Yao model of an attacker is included with UMLsec to model the in-
teraction with the environment. [14] proposes a collection of security patterns that include
security-specific and requirements-oriented information. The behavioral aspects of a pat-
tern are depicted as state machine or sequence diagram, and constraints that must hold are
expressed in LTL. [82] extends UMLsec to model peer-to-peer applications along with their
security aspects. It relies on the concept of abuse cases defined as UML use cases and state
machine diagrams to represent attack scenarios. [86] elaborates security requirements by
constructing intentional anti-models. It addresses malicious obstacles set up by attackers
to threaten security goals. [84] presents an approach to verify security and time-related
requirements. Both, UMLsec and MARTE profiles are used to address security and time.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, a security assessment framework has been proposed to automatically ex-
press and evaluate security requirements in systems/software modeled by using SysML
activity diagrams. This framework models the standard catalogue of common attack pat-
terns as application-independent SysML activity diagrams templates. These templates are
used to easily instantiate an application-dependent attack diagrams. To this end, we have
defined the attack/system diagram interaction and map it into PRISM code. In addition,
we have developed a specification algorithm that transforms SysML activity diagrams into
the probabilistic temporal logic ”PCTL”. The effectiveness of our contribution has been
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demonstrated by illustrating how expressing security properties and evaluating them easily
on the secure real time streaming protocol. This framework helps to reduce the develop-
ment cost by allowing flaws detection and measuring security level at an earlier stage of
software/system life cycle. The next chapter concludes the thesis by summing up the major





To tackle the difficulty in the security verification process of model-based systems, we
developed a novel formal framework that includes two parts: one for security specification
and a second for the formal verification of security. The main purpose of this framework is
to improve the verification process of model-based system, so they can meet the essential
security requirements.
We described the state of the art in the area of the verification and the security spec-
ification of model-based systems using model checking that, to the best of our knowledge,
does not have the required infrastructure to deal with security formal verification of com-
posed and interacted SysML behavioral diagrams.
To deal with the formal verification, we defined the adequate formal semantics of
SysML activity diagrams that helps to verify them easily by using model checker. Our
verification approach maps a set of SysML activity diagrams composed by call behavior and
communication actions into the input language of the probabilistic model checker PRISM.
To this end, we proved the soundness of our proposed verification approach by defining
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adequately the relationship between the semantics of the mapped diagrams and the resulting
PRISM models. This is done by formalizing PRISM models. In addition, we proved the
preservation of the satisfaction of PCTL properties by this relation.
Moreover, we defined the behavior of attacks as SysML activity diagrams based on
a standard catalogue of common attack patterns. These patterns are used to build attack
scenarios encompassing probabilistic and non-deterministic behaviors. The result is a li-
brary of security templates that facilitate the formal expressiveness of temporal logic. We
developed a specification algorithm that generates temporal logic expressions starting from
security templates. Then, by using the proposed verification approach, we showed how to
evaluate systems’ security level based on its design model and a set of attack scenarios.
To minimize the verification cost, we presented a formal abstraction framework to
improve the scalability of probabilistic model-checking in general, and more especially for
verifying UML and SysML activity diagrams. We proved the soundness of the abstraction
algorithm by defining a probabilistic weak simulation relation between the semantics of the
abstract and the concrete diagrams. In addition, the preservation of the satisfaction of PCTL
properties by this relation is proved.
To avoid the verification complexity of the composed diagrams, we proposed a com-
positional verification approach to improve the efficiency and the scalability of probabilistic
model-checking. The presented solution is based on decomposing a global PCTL property
into local ones with respect to interfaces between diagrams. We proved the soundness of the
proposed framework by showing that the satisfaction relation of the PCTL properties are
preserved. In addition, we demonstrated the effectiveness of our framework by verifying
real systems that require a large amount of memory and time processing.
To the best of our knowledge, this thesis proposes an efficient security verification
framework of model-based systems, which behavior can be expressed as a probabilistic
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system that exhibit non-determinism.
7.2 Future Work
In future, we would like to extend our work by investigating several directions. First, we
extend our framework to support more system features, and more diagrams such as state
machines and sequence diagrams. This targets to extend the proposed formal semantics to
handle the new features. Also, this helps to ensure the equivalence between the different
diagrams by finding a common semantics. Another important aspect is extracting the for-
mal syntax of diagrams automatically from the existing standard meta-models. Concerning
the specification part of the framework, we intend to handle the reliability requirements of
systems, and, prove the completeness of the proposed extension. In addition, expressing
the system requirements by using different diagrams. For the abstraction part, we intend to
transform a SysML activity diagram to its fractal form in order to benefit from our abstrac-
tion framework. This helps in the abstraction/refinement process of UML/SysML diagrams.
By adding new system features, we have to explore other abstraction approaches especially
data abstraction targeting specific system features like time and objects. Also, we intend
to investigate reducing the property within the model. In the compositional part, we target
to extend the compositional verification technique for other composition operators such as
send and receive messages. And, we plan to extend our framework to handle more com-
positional verification techniques like assume-guaranty. Finally, we want to validate our
framework on more complex system especially the cyber-physical systems.
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In this Appendix, we present proofs of the previous theorems and propositions.
Lemma A.1 (Soundness). The mapping algorithm Γ is sound, i.e. MA R MP .
Proof. To prove MA R MP , we follow a structural induction reasoning on NuAC terms
and their related PRISM terms. For that, let s,s′ ∈ S(MA ) and t, t ′ ∈ S(MP). We distinguish
the following cases where L(s) takes different values:
1. L(s) = l : xN such as x ∈ {ι,a,a!v}⇒ ∃s l−→1 s′, L(s′) = l : xN .
For L(t) = Γ(L(s)), we have L(t) = 〈L(x),¬L(N )〉 then ∃t l−→1 t ′ where L(t ′) =
〈¬L(x),L(N )〉.
2. L(s) = l : then ∃s l−→1 s′ such as L(s′) = |A |. For L(t) = Γ(L(s)), we have L(t) =
〈l〉 then ∃t l−→1 t ′ where ∀li ∈L : L(t ′) = 〈· · · ,¬li, · · · 〉.
3. L(s) = l : then ∃s l−→1 s′ such as L(s′) = l :. For L(t) = Γ(L(s)), we have L(t) =
〈l〉 then ∃t l−→1 t ′ where L(t ′) = 〈¬l〉.
4. L(s) = l : F(N1,N2)
m then ∃s l−→1 s′ such as L(s′) = l : F(N1,N2)
m−1
. For L(t) =
Γ(L(s)), we have L(t)= 〈l,¬lN1,¬lN2〉 then ∃t
l
−→1 t ′ where ∀l : L(t ′)= 〈¬l, lN1, lN2〉.
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From the obtained results, we found that μ(s) = μ(t) = 1 then sR t. In addition, the
unique initial state of MA is always corresponding to the unique initial state in MP . By
following the same style of proof, we find that MA R MP , which confirms that Lemma
3.1 holds.
Proposition A.1 (PCTL Preservation). For two PAs MA and MP such that Γ(A ) = P
where MA R MP . For a PCTL property φ , then: (MA |= φ)⇔ (MP |= φ).
Proof. To prove the preservation of PCTL properties, we follow an inductive reasoning on
the PCTL structure. WhileMA R MP , for each PCTL operator ζ ∈{¬,∧,X,U≤k,U,P p}
we have: MA |= ζ ⇐⇒MP |= ζ which means:





LetA be a SysML activity diagram and Â is its abstracted model obtained by the algorithm
δ with respect to a PCTL property φ . The complexity of checking φ takes into consideration
the complexity of the abstraction algorithm δ , the complexity of the mapping algorithm
of the obtained diagram into PRISM code and the complexity of the probabilistic model
checking procedure. The both first algorithms are a DFS-based procedures with a time
complexity of O(|A |), the third one is of O(Poly(|MA |)×υmax× |φ |) such that υmax =
max{k : φ1U≤kφ2 occurs in φ} and MA ≡S (A ). Hence, Equation B.1 and Equation B.2
present the complexity with and without abstraction, respectively.
A=O(A |= p) =O(|A |)+O(Poly(|MA |)×υmax×|φ |) (B.1)




By comparing the equations B.1 and B.2, we have:
B< A ⇔ |A |+ |Â |+Poly(|M
Â
|)×υmax×|φ |< |A |+Poly(|MA |)×υmax×|φ |
⇔ |Â |+Poly(|M
Â
|)×υmax×|φ |< Poly(|MA |)×υmax×|φ |











 1(while |Â |Poly(|MA |)×υmax×|φ | ! 0)
From this result of comparison, we conclude that applying the abstraction is useful for any
model.
B.2 The Abstraction Approach Proof
Proposition B.1. Let A = A0 ↑a1 . . . ↑ak Ak be a SysML activity diagram with k call be-
haviors and φ be a PCTL property. Then:
∀i≤ k : A0 ↑a1 . . . ↑ai Ai |= φ ⇒ A |= φ .
Proof. The proof of this proposition follows an induction reasoning on PCTL structure by
taking into consideration the size of call behaviors composition “k”.
1. Case of φ = φ1Uφ2
Let i< k: A0 ↑a1 . . . ↑ai Ai |= φ (Assumption)
⇔∃m, ∀ j<m : π( j) |=Adv φ1∧π(m) |=Adv φ2. (Definition)
By calling a new behaviorAi+1, the satisfaction path π will not be changed while ai+1
stays unchanged during the execution of Ai+1 then we have:
∃m′, ∀ j′ < m′ : π( j′) |=Adv φ1∧π(m′) |=Adv φ2 ⇔ A0 ↑a1 . . . ↑ai+1 Ai+1 |= φ .
By following the same kind of construction up to k behavior, we will have:
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A0 ↑a1 . . . ↑ak Ak |= φ which means:
∃m′′, ∀ j′′ < m′′ : π( j′′) |=Adv φ1∧π(m′′) |=Adv φ2. Then: A |= φ1Uφ2.
By following the same kind of proof, we deduce the satisfaction relation for φ1U≤kφ2
and Xφ cases.
2. Case of φ = φ1U≤ lφ2
When j′′ = j and m′′ = m after calling a new behavior then A |= φ1U≤ lφ2. Else,
A |= φ1U≤ l′φ2 such that l′ ≥ l
3. Case of Xφ
While ai+1 stays true during the execution ofAi+1 then the next operator is preserved.
Proposition B.2. Let A = A0 ↑a1 . . . ↑ak Ak be a SysML activity diagram with k call be-
haviors, Aid is the identity element for “↑” operator and φ be a PCTL property. For a
proposition α , we have the following:
∀1 ≤ i≤ k, α /∈ (∑φ ∩∑Ai) : [Ai =Aid ∧ (A0 ↑a1 . . . ↑ak Ak) |= φ ]⇒ [A |= φ ].
Proof. The proof is similar to that one of Proposition 4.1, for both cases of until and next
operators. For the case of bounded until, the satisfaction of φ is not deduced while some
steps are mimicked by the identity element. But, we can infer the satisfaction of two im-
portant properties are:
1. ∀1 ≤ i≤ k, α /∈ (∑φ ∩∑Ai) :
[Ai =Aid ∧ (A0 ↑a1 . . . ↑ak Ak) |= φ1U≤ lφ2]⇒A |= φ1Uφ2.
2. ∀1 ≤ i≤ k, α /∈ (∑φ ∩∑Ai) :




Proposition B.3 (Application Order). Let “A ” be a NuAC term and “φ” be a PCTL prop-
erty, we have: Ψ(ϒ(Ψ(A ),φ))≡ Ψ(ϒ(A ,φ)).
Proof. Let M1 = Ψ(A ),M2 = ϒ(M1,φ) and M3 = Ψ(M2), we have:
1. M1 = Ψ(A )⇔ if ∃l : NkNm ∈A , then l : NkNm is replaced by l : Nkm if one
of the control merging rules is satisfied.
2. M2 = ϒ(M1,φ)⇔ ∀a /∈ Σφ : ϒ(l : anN ,φ) = l : εnN . In fact, ϒ produces new
consecutive control nodes and preserves the diagram structure.
3. M3 = Ψ(M2)⇔ if ∃l : NiN j ∈ A , then l : NiN j is replaced by l : Ni j. The
minimization rules are applied on the initial and the produced one by Ψ function.
It is clear that the first step has no effect on the second one. In addition, applying Ψ two
times successively is equivalent to applying it once. Thus, the proposition holds.
B.4 Abstraction Soundness Proof
Lemma B.1 (ϒ-Soundness). The abstraction algorithm ϒ is sound, i.e. MA Rϒ MÂ .
Proof. To proveMA Rϒ MÂ , we follow a structural induction reasoning on NuAC terms
such that Â = ϒ(A ). For that, let s,s′ ∈ S(MA )1 and t, t ′ ∈ S(MÂ ). We distinguish the
following cases where L(s) takes different values:
• Case aN :
Let L(s) = aN ⇒∃ s′ : s→ s′ by applying ACT-2 such that:
L(s′) = aN ⇒ μs(s′) = 1.
1S(M) is the set of states ofM.
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By considering t as the abstracted state of s where L(t) = ϒ(L(s)), we can distinguish
two cases for ABS-1 and ABS-2 that are presented respectively as follows:
1. a ∈Σφ : L(t) = ϒ(aN ) = a ϒ(N ). By applying ACT-2, ∃ t ′ : t→ t ′ such
that: L(t ′) = aϒ(N )⇒ μt(t ′) = 1. Then, it exists a weight function  for
Rϒ = {(s′, t ′)} such that:
(s′, t ′) = 1 ⇒ μs(s′) =(s′, t ′) and (t ′,s′) = 1 ⇒ μt(t ′) =(t ′,s′).
While (s, t)> 0 then sRϒ t.
2. a /∈Σφ : L(t) = ϒ(s) = ϒ(aN ) = ε ϒ(N )⇒∃ t ′ : t→ t ′.
By applying ACT-2 rule such that L(t ′) = εN ⇒ μ2(t ′) = 1. Then it exists
a weight function  for Rϒ = {(s′, t ′)} such that:
(s′, t ′) = 1 ⇒ (s′, t ′) = μs(s′) and (t ′,s′) = 1 ⇒ μt(t ′) = (t ′,s′), with
(s, t)> 0 then sRϒ t.
• Case N1
g
→N2 is similar to the case of aN after applying ABS-3 and ABS-4.
It is clear that, the marked NuAC term A is the unique initial state of MA corresponding
to the unique initial state inM
Â
. By following the same style of proof, we find:
MA Rϒ MÂ , which confirms that Proposition 4.1 holds.
Proposition B.4 (ϒ-Preservation). For two PAs MA and MÂ such that MA Rϒ MÂ . If φ
is a PCTL\X property, then we have: (MÂ |= φ)⇒ (MA |= φ).
Proof. To prove the preservation of PCTL properties by Rϒ, we follow an inductive rea-
soning on PCTL structure after applying each ϒ-abstraction rule.
Let π ∈ M with π = (s0 · · · si · · · s j · · · sn) and π ′ ∈ M̂ with π ′ = (t0 · · · tk · · · tl · · · tm)
are two finite paths such that; ∀s ∈ π : ∃s′ ∈ π ′, sRϒ s
′. For PCTL expression satisfaction,
we distinguish these cases:
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• Case φ1Uφ2:
For π and π ′ such that: π ′ |= φ1Uφ2 ⇔ ∃r′ ≤ m : ∀u ≤ r′ − 1, L(s′u) = φ1 and
L(s′r) = φ2. Similarly, π |= φ1Uφ2 ⇔∃r ≤ n : ∀w≤ r−1, L(sw) = φ1 and L(sr) = φ2.
By applying the ABS rules, the states that do not satisfy either φ1 and φ2 in π are
mimicked.
Consequently, π ′ |= φ1Uφ2 ⇒ π |= (φ1 ⇒ Fφ2).
• Case P p[φ1Uφ2]:
We have π ′ |= φ1Uφ2 ⇒ π |= (φ1 ⇒ Fφ2) and the mimicked states with the ABS rules
have a Dirac distribution, then: π ′ |= P p[φ1Uφ2]⇒ π |= P p[φ1 ⇒ Fφ2].
By following the same proof style on PCTL structure, we conclude that:
(M
Â
|= P p[φ ])⇒ (MA |= P p[φ ]).
Lemma B.2 (Ψ-Soundness). The abstraction algorithmΨ is sound, i.e. MA RΨ MÂ .
Proof. To proveMA RΨ MÂ , we follow a structural induction reasoning on NuAC terms
by comparing each term before and after applying Ψ rules. Let s0,s1,s2,s3,s4 ∈ S(MA ) and
t0, t1, t2, t3 ∈ S(MÂ ). We distinguish the following cases where L(s0) takes different values:
• Case D(p,g,N ,N ′): Let L(s0) =D(p1,g1,N1,N
′
1 ), by applying PDEC-1 rule, we
will have: s0 → μ0(s1,s2) such that:
– L(s1) = D(p1,g1,N1,N
′
1 ) such as μ0(s1) = p1,
– L(s2) = D(p1,g1,N1,N
′
1 ) such as μ0(s2) = 1− p1.
By considering N1 = D(p2,g2,N2,N
′
2 ), let t0 be the merged state of s0 with s1 by
applying the MIN-2 rule, we will have:
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L(t0) = D(p1 × p2,g1 ∧g2,N2,N
′
2 ,1− p1,N ′1) ⇒ ∃t1, t2, t3 : t0 → μ ′(t1, t2, t3). By
applying PDEC-1 rule, we have:
– L(t1) = D(p1× p2,g1∧g2,N 2,N
′
2 ,1− p1,¬g1,N ′1)⇒ μ ′(t1) = p1 ×p2.




1)⇒ μ ′(t2) = p1×(1− p2).




1 )⇒ μ ′(t3) = 1− p1.
It exists a weight function  for RΨ = {(s0, t0),(s3, t1),(s4, t2),(s2, t3)} such that:
1. (s3, t1) = p1 ⇒(s3, t1) = μ ′(t1)
2. (s4, t2) = p1× (1− p2)⇒(s4, t2) = μ ′(t2)
3. (s2, t3) = 1− p1 ⇒(s2, t3) = μ ′(t3)
We have: ((s3, t1)> 0∧(s2, t3)> 0)∧(s4, t2)> 0)⇒ μ RΨ μ ′.
It is clear that, the marked NuAC term A is the unique initial state of MA corresponding
to the unique initial state inM
Â
. By following the same style of proof, we find:
MA RΨ MÂ , which confirms that Proposition 4.1 holds.
Proposition B.5 (Ψ-Preservation). For two PAs MA and MÂ such that MA RΨ MÂ . If φ
is a PCTL property, then we have: (M
Â
|= φ)⇒ (MA |= φ).
Proof. To prove the preservation of PCTL properties by RΨ, we follow an inductive rea-
soning on PCTL structure for each ϒ-abstraction rule.
Let π ∈ M with π = (s0 · · · si · · · s j · · · sn) and π ′ ∈ M̂ with π ′ = (t0 · · · tk · · · tl · · · tm)
are two finite paths such that; ∀s∈ π : ∃s′ ∈ π ′, sRΨ s
′. For PCTL expression satisfaction,
we distinguish these cases:
• Case φ1Uφ2:
For π and π ′ such that: π ′ |= φ1Uφ2 ⇔∃r′ ≤ m : ∀u≤ r′ −1, L(s′u) = φ1 and L(s′r) =
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φ2. Similarly, π |= φ1Uφ2 ⇔∃r ≤ n : ∀w≤ r−1, L(sw) = φ1 and L(sr) = φ2.
By applying MIN rules, some states in π are merged.
Consequently, π ′ |= φ1Uφ2 ⇒ π |= φ1 ⇒ Fφ2.
• Case P p[φ1Uφ2]:
We have π ′ |= φ1Uφ2 ⇒ π |= φ1 ⇒ Fφ2 and the merged states with MIN rules accu-
mulate the probabilistic distribution, then: π ′ |= P p[φ1Uφ2]⇒ π |= P p[φ1 ⇒ Fφ2].
By following the same proof style on PCTL structure, we conclude that:
(M
Â
|= φ)⇒ (MA |= φ).
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